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.16 Consequently, anyone who wanted to could becomea Russian.This idea has got Russians into trouble in the past; indeed,most of my respondents had no idea why people in the former Sovietrepublics would not have welcomed the opportunity to become Russians.But it is not a sound basis for wars of domination, and if that is whatPutin intends by his commitment to the strength of Russia, then myrespondents are unlikely to follow along.On the whole, my respondents did not favor a return to the past anddid not see Putin leading them backward.About the Communists, Nataliasaid, That train has left. Tatiana Mikhailovna called the Communists poor little ones and noted that they were more unassuming and modestthan they had been when in power and consequently now caused littletrouble.Certainly the Communist Party had its supporters.Many of myolder respondents admitted that they had been Communists their wholelives; some still voted Communist if only out of nostalgia and melancholyover what had been lost,17 mostly not with the confidence that the Commu-nist Party, if in power, would make their lives any better.As Zoia Igorevna, alifelong party member, remarked, They also came to naught. For most ofmy respondents, a return to Communism was no longer a question of anyinterest.As far as they were concerned, Putin was taking them somewhereelse.The destination might not be perfect, but it was surely different fromwhat had existed in the past.Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians demonstrated against riggedelections in fall 2004.Reports are that they saw in opposition leader ViktorYushchenko a cleaner and more competent leader who would lead thecountry out of endemic corruption and into the civilized world.18 MyRussian respondents may be wrong, but many of them are of the opinionthat this is the leader they already have in Vladimir Putin.Putin s highapproval ratings indicate his citizens unwillingness to give up on this hope.The Verdict on CultureThis book began as an effort to examine presumptions about Russianpolitical culture, particularly the idea that today s Russians inherited a set16.Similarly, see Fran Markowitz, Coming of Age in Post-Soviet Russia (Urbana: Universityof Illinois Press, 2000), 145 60.17.This phrase is from Dima s comments.18.Adrian Karatnycky, Ukraine s Orange Revolution, Foreign Affairs 84, no.2 (2005): 35 52. 03.Carnaghan Ch8-End 1/17/07 12:16 PM Page 280280 Out of Orderof ideas and values from their own past that made Russia s citizens obstaclesto the deepening of democracy.The verdict from the interviews is thatinherited attitudes are not a major obstacle to building democracy in Russia.For one thing, the interviews provide little evidence of some of the traitsoften used to characterize Russian political culture: my respondents werenot especially authoritarian, egalitarian, messianic, or utopian.They didnot show a preference for extremes over moderation.They were not waitingfor government to take care of them.Most appreciated the value of law asa means to regulate an imperfect society, and none craved the reinstitu-tion of a totalitarian political order.19It is true, though, that some other aspects of traditional Russian politicalculture still seem current today.In particular, my respondents are attractedto the ideal of social order, although they do not all mean the same thingwhen they talk about order. In addition, my respondents were fairlycynical about government and about their own ability to influence theirrulers.Most of them felt that the gap between ordinary people and thosewho led them was huge and, at least for now, insurmountable.For many,the only ray of hope was that Vladimir Putin seemed to have their long-runinterests at heart, or at least he performed much better than any of hispredecessors in this regard.What I have tried to show in this book is that, even though many Russiansrespond to their government in ways characteristic of traditional Russianpolitical culture, this is not necessarily because they inherited orientationsthat make it hard for them to trust either those who govern them or oneanother.The intensive interviews on which this book is based provideconsiderable evidence that present attitudes are reflections of presentconditions.Russian citizens are cynical about government because theirgovernment has done little to respond to their needs.They are slow toengage in the sustained political activity that might raise the profile oftheir demands because they lack confidence that the payoff would beworth their effort.And besides, with the few opportunities provided byRussia s cutthroat capitalism, ordinary Russians must devote considerableattention to just getting by.Theirs is an unpredictable and challenging19.For these traits of Russian political culture, see McDaniel, The Agony of the RussianIdea, 32 46; Frederic J.Fleron Jr. Congruence Theory Applied: Democratization in Russia, in Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia? Explorations in State-Society Relations, ed.Harry Eckstein, Frederic J.Fleron Jr., Erik Hoffmann, and William Reisinger (New York: Rowmanand Littlefield, 1998), 36; Vainshstein, Totalitarian Public Consciousness, 256. 03.Carnaghan Ch8-End 1/17/07 12:16 PM Page 281Conclusion 281world, perhaps slowly becoming more orderly under the guidance ofVladimir Putin.Particularly in terms of the ways in which they relate to government,though, it is also clear that Russians today carry some heavy baggage leftover from the Soviet period.For all but the youngest of my respondents,their views of government were formed under Soviet power, and the basicsubstance of those views has changed little since the collapse of Communistrule.From their perspective, there has been little reason to change howthey relate to government, since much of the time government continuesto act like a hostile, alien force.But as long as citizens do not change, as longas they do not object to their government s compromises of democraticpractice and tendency to ignore the needs of the population, they must beara portion of the responsibility for the fate of democracy in Russia.Given the context in which Russians form their attitudes about govern-ment, it is hardly surprising that many Russian citizens expect little fromtheir government and feel powerless to change it, that they fail to endorseevery particular of the new political and economic systems that have notyet greatly improved their lives.But it also seems certain that these peoplewho managed to survive the Soviet system, its collapse, and the messyrestructuring of their whole society could also adjust to democracy.If onlythe people who rule them choose to allow it. 03 [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.16 Consequently, anyone who wanted to could becomea Russian.This idea has got Russians into trouble in the past; indeed,most of my respondents had no idea why people in the former Sovietrepublics would not have welcomed the opportunity to become Russians.But it is not a sound basis for wars of domination, and if that is whatPutin intends by his commitment to the strength of Russia, then myrespondents are unlikely to follow along.On the whole, my respondents did not favor a return to the past anddid not see Putin leading them backward.About the Communists, Nataliasaid, That train has left. Tatiana Mikhailovna called the Communists poor little ones and noted that they were more unassuming and modestthan they had been when in power and consequently now caused littletrouble.Certainly the Communist Party had its supporters.Many of myolder respondents admitted that they had been Communists their wholelives; some still voted Communist if only out of nostalgia and melancholyover what had been lost,17 mostly not with the confidence that the Commu-nist Party, if in power, would make their lives any better.As Zoia Igorevna, alifelong party member, remarked, They also came to naught. For most ofmy respondents, a return to Communism was no longer a question of anyinterest.As far as they were concerned, Putin was taking them somewhereelse.The destination might not be perfect, but it was surely different fromwhat had existed in the past.Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians demonstrated against riggedelections in fall 2004.Reports are that they saw in opposition leader ViktorYushchenko a cleaner and more competent leader who would lead thecountry out of endemic corruption and into the civilized world.18 MyRussian respondents may be wrong, but many of them are of the opinionthat this is the leader they already have in Vladimir Putin.Putin s highapproval ratings indicate his citizens unwillingness to give up on this hope.The Verdict on CultureThis book began as an effort to examine presumptions about Russianpolitical culture, particularly the idea that today s Russians inherited a set16.Similarly, see Fran Markowitz, Coming of Age in Post-Soviet Russia (Urbana: Universityof Illinois Press, 2000), 145 60.17.This phrase is from Dima s comments.18.Adrian Karatnycky, Ukraine s Orange Revolution, Foreign Affairs 84, no.2 (2005): 35 52. 03.Carnaghan Ch8-End 1/17/07 12:16 PM Page 280280 Out of Orderof ideas and values from their own past that made Russia s citizens obstaclesto the deepening of democracy.The verdict from the interviews is thatinherited attitudes are not a major obstacle to building democracy in Russia.For one thing, the interviews provide little evidence of some of the traitsoften used to characterize Russian political culture: my respondents werenot especially authoritarian, egalitarian, messianic, or utopian.They didnot show a preference for extremes over moderation.They were not waitingfor government to take care of them.Most appreciated the value of law asa means to regulate an imperfect society, and none craved the reinstitu-tion of a totalitarian political order.19It is true, though, that some other aspects of traditional Russian politicalculture still seem current today.In particular, my respondents are attractedto the ideal of social order, although they do not all mean the same thingwhen they talk about order. In addition, my respondents were fairlycynical about government and about their own ability to influence theirrulers.Most of them felt that the gap between ordinary people and thosewho led them was huge and, at least for now, insurmountable.For many,the only ray of hope was that Vladimir Putin seemed to have their long-runinterests at heart, or at least he performed much better than any of hispredecessors in this regard.What I have tried to show in this book is that, even though many Russiansrespond to their government in ways characteristic of traditional Russianpolitical culture, this is not necessarily because they inherited orientationsthat make it hard for them to trust either those who govern them or oneanother.The intensive interviews on which this book is based provideconsiderable evidence that present attitudes are reflections of presentconditions.Russian citizens are cynical about government because theirgovernment has done little to respond to their needs.They are slow toengage in the sustained political activity that might raise the profile oftheir demands because they lack confidence that the payoff would beworth their effort.And besides, with the few opportunities provided byRussia s cutthroat capitalism, ordinary Russians must devote considerableattention to just getting by.Theirs is an unpredictable and challenging19.For these traits of Russian political culture, see McDaniel, The Agony of the RussianIdea, 32 46; Frederic J.Fleron Jr. Congruence Theory Applied: Democratization in Russia, in Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia? Explorations in State-Society Relations, ed.Harry Eckstein, Frederic J.Fleron Jr., Erik Hoffmann, and William Reisinger (New York: Rowmanand Littlefield, 1998), 36; Vainshstein, Totalitarian Public Consciousness, 256. 03.Carnaghan Ch8-End 1/17/07 12:16 PM Page 281Conclusion 281world, perhaps slowly becoming more orderly under the guidance ofVladimir Putin.Particularly in terms of the ways in which they relate to government,though, it is also clear that Russians today carry some heavy baggage leftover from the Soviet period.For all but the youngest of my respondents,their views of government were formed under Soviet power, and the basicsubstance of those views has changed little since the collapse of Communistrule.From their perspective, there has been little reason to change howthey relate to government, since much of the time government continuesto act like a hostile, alien force.But as long as citizens do not change, as longas they do not object to their government s compromises of democraticpractice and tendency to ignore the needs of the population, they must beara portion of the responsibility for the fate of democracy in Russia.Given the context in which Russians form their attitudes about govern-ment, it is hardly surprising that many Russian citizens expect little fromtheir government and feel powerless to change it, that they fail to endorseevery particular of the new political and economic systems that have notyet greatly improved their lives.But it also seems certain that these peoplewho managed to survive the Soviet system, its collapse, and the messyrestructuring of their whole society could also adjust to democracy.If onlythe people who rule them choose to allow it. 03 [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]