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.The September 2001 attacks provide a good example of how the Al Qaeda network tookadvantage of globalization.Before hijacking the planes, the terrorists studied in Hamburg, took flyinglessons in Florida, used cellular phones and e-mail to communicate with each other and accessed theInternet to make hotel and plane reservations.Although the US maintains a public stance of no concessions to terrorists, practice has not always beenso pure.The Reagan administration dealt with Iran in order to finance the Contras in Nicaragua.President Clinton invited Sinn Fein leader, Gerry Adams, to the White House, although the Britishgovernment argued that Adams had been a leading member of the IRA.Successive Presidents havedealt with Yasser Arafat, the PLO leader, although many Israelis have dubbed him a terrorist.Aperennial problem is differing perspectives on terrorists and terrorist activities.One person s terrorist isanother person s freedom fighter.Americans fighting for independence were dubbed as  terrorists bythe British.Menachim Begin, a former Israeli Prime Minister, was at one stage wanted by the British forterrorist acts.The US was slow to recognize Nelson Mandela as a black South African freedom fighterinstead of a terrorist.To many Arabs, Osama bin Laden is a heroic freedom fighter against theAmerican, Saudi, and Egyptian governments.Another dilemma for policymakers is the need to identify the perpetrators of particular terrorist acts andthose who train, fund, or otherwise support or sponsor them.The majority of those involved in theSeptember 2001 attacks were Saudi citizens but the US struck back at Afghanistan not Saudi Arabia.Afurther complicating factor is that many terrorists seem to be individuals who do not work for any stateand who may have no or only loose links to a known terrorist organization.The worldwide threat ofsuch individual terrorism, or spontaneous terrorist activity is likely to increase.This will pose problemsfor the US which has traditionally sought to pin responsibility for terrorism on states.A desire to punisha state for supporting international terrorism may also be subject to conflicting foreign policy objectives.Another problem in the wake of the number of incidents associated with Islamic fundamentalist groupsis how to condemn and combat such terrorist activity, and the extreme and violent ideology of specificradical groups, without appearing to be anti-Islamic in general.President Bush seemed to recognize thisdilemma as one of his first acts after 11 September was to visit a mosque in an attempt to reassure thefour million Muslims living in the US that they were not tainted with the brush of the terrorists.file:///C|/Users/nickel/Desktop/_93118__9780203356265__9780203303450__/files/page_142.html[01.11.2009 19:04:15] page_143Page 143Policy optionsThe US has employed a range of options to combat international terrorism, from diplomacy andinternational cooperation to economic sanctions, covert action, protective security measures and militaryforce.The use of force after the 11 September 2001 attacks was almost inevitable given the number ofcasualties and the strong desire for revenge.In fighting the Taliban and Osama bin Laden the US wasnot a reluctant but a very willing sheriff.Although not without problems, military force, particularly whenwielded by a superpower such as the US, can have a decisive impact.The 1986 decision to bomb Libyafor its alleged role in the bombing of a German discotheque was one example of the use of militaryforce.Other examples include the 1993 bombing of Iraq s military intelligence headquarters in responseto Iraqi efforts to assassinate former President George Bush during a visit to Kuwait and the 1998missile attacks against bases in Afghanistan and an alleged chemical production facility in Sudanfollowing the attacks on US embassies in East Africa.The prime example of the use of force was the military campaign against the Taliban regime and the AlQaeda network in Afghanistan in 2001.The swift military victory over the Taliban, accomplished with theAfghan Northern Alliance, was unforeseen and gave rise to a new confident spirit in the Pentagon andWhite House.Military force, especially the precision bombing and the use of special units, was seen tohave played a crucial role in bringing about a change of government in Afghanistan.Many argued that itshould be employed for similar purposes elsewhere, particularly an attack on Iraq.President George W.Bush seemed to agree with those arguing for a regime change in Iraq by stating on 11 March 2002 that  inaction was not an option.Although the war on terrorism was being fought by bankers, police, customs agents and IT specialists, itwas the military that captured the headlines.Washington made it abundantly clear that it was not onlyready to use force in retaliation for terrorist acts but that it has the best military capabilities in the worldfor such tasks.The administration also hoped that proof of US military success and its willingness to actoverseas may deter other groups or states harboring terrorist groups.Not everyone was pleased at theemphasis on a military response.Strobe Talbott, the Deputy Secretary of State during the Clintonadministration, held that  encouraging stable political development is the key to reducing our greatestsecurity threat.We have no option but to get back into the nation-building business (Foreign Policy inFocus, November/December 2001) [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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