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.Expertise was essential for stockpile surveillance, evaluation and maintenance,nuclear weapons repairs, to guard against technological surprise, and to resumeproduction of nuclear weapons if needed.202 Concern over the loss of nuclearweapons expertise mounted in Congress throughout the 1990s.203 In 1994Siegfried Hecker, director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, stated that a freefalling weapons R&D budget is sapping talent and leaving us dangerously thinin some vital skills needed for nuclear weapons stewardship and lamented con-tinued budget cuts and the perceived lack of national support under the Clinton Nuclear policy under Bill Clinton 53administration.204 DOE s 1999 30-day review, for example, confirmed that itfaced challenges in maintaining the proper skill mix and attracting and retaininga first class workforce and reported that the LANL and LLNL were experiencingsignificant difficulties in attracting and retaining staff for senior positions.205Problems at the DOEThe Clinton administration s tending of the production complex was heavilycriticised by Congress.Critics accused the administration of erosion by designby ending testing, under funding the SSP, delaying resumption of tritium andplutonium pit production, and allowing nuclear weapons expertise to wither,leaving America with only a minimal capability to maintain the nuclear stock-pile.206 At the time of the 1994 NPR members of the Senate Armed ServicesCommittee urged the administration to revive our nuclear weapons complex orface an unsafe stockpile leading to unilateral disarmament.207 Energy SecretaryHazel O Leary s 1993 Openness Initiative to systematically declassify andreclassify whole areas of information on nuclear testing, the production ofnuclear materials and other subjects also drew criticism.208 The aim was to openup nuclear weapons policy, engage the public on the state of the productioncomplex, and lift the veil of Cold War secrecy and move the Department ofEnergy into a new era of government openness.209 This sparked opposition fromCongress and led to accusations that DOE was taking a strong anti-nuclearweapons stance from outside and inside the administration.210 In 1994, forexample, O Leary came under fire from Deputy Secretary of Defense JohnDeutch for not providing sufficient funds for nuclear weapons activities.211These criticisms were reflected in a number of important reports that lam-basted the management, purpose and direction of the SSP, the warhead LEPsand the consolidation and modernisation of the complex under DOE.The 1994Task Force on Alternative Futures for the National Laboratories examinedoptions for change within DOE s national laboratories, particularly the Depart-ment s three nuclear weapons laboratories and produced the Galvin Report;212the 1996 Commission on Maintaining United States Nuclear Weapons Expertisedeveloped a plan for recruiting and retaining nuclear weapons expertise withinDOE and led to the Chiles Commission report in 1999;213 and a study of DOE smanagement of the nuclear weapons programme was commissioned from theInstitute for Defense Analysis in 1997, also known as the 120-day study.214 Allthree reports criticised DOE and highlighted poor management and the import-ance of retaining nuclear weapons expertise.The 1998 Defense Science Board sTask Force on Nuclear Deterrence also criticised the administration for havingno long-term plan for the nuclear arsenal and a 1999 study by the JASON groupof nuclear scientists concluded that there was little evidence of an overall planfor long-term production needs under the SSP.215At the end of the 1990s Congress concluded that DOE s handling of thenuclear mission was not improving and that change required Congressionalintervention.Representative Thornberry, for example, stated in 1999 that 54 Nuclear policy under Bill ClintonOne of the things that is broken is the organizational structure and manage-ment of the nuclear weapons complex in the Department of Energy.Studyafter study, report after report, commission after commission have foundthat DOE s management of our nuclear weapons program has been amess.216In 1999 Congress directed DOD and DOE to produce a comprehensive NuclearMission Management Plan to ensure the long-term viability of the R&D andmanufacturing infrastructure for strategic nuclear systems and a plan to retaincore nuclear weapons expertise [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.Expertise was essential for stockpile surveillance, evaluation and maintenance,nuclear weapons repairs, to guard against technological surprise, and to resumeproduction of nuclear weapons if needed.202 Concern over the loss of nuclearweapons expertise mounted in Congress throughout the 1990s.203 In 1994Siegfried Hecker, director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, stated that a freefalling weapons R&D budget is sapping talent and leaving us dangerously thinin some vital skills needed for nuclear weapons stewardship and lamented con-tinued budget cuts and the perceived lack of national support under the Clinton Nuclear policy under Bill Clinton 53administration.204 DOE s 1999 30-day review, for example, confirmed that itfaced challenges in maintaining the proper skill mix and attracting and retaininga first class workforce and reported that the LANL and LLNL were experiencingsignificant difficulties in attracting and retaining staff for senior positions.205Problems at the DOEThe Clinton administration s tending of the production complex was heavilycriticised by Congress.Critics accused the administration of erosion by designby ending testing, under funding the SSP, delaying resumption of tritium andplutonium pit production, and allowing nuclear weapons expertise to wither,leaving America with only a minimal capability to maintain the nuclear stock-pile.206 At the time of the 1994 NPR members of the Senate Armed ServicesCommittee urged the administration to revive our nuclear weapons complex orface an unsafe stockpile leading to unilateral disarmament.207 Energy SecretaryHazel O Leary s 1993 Openness Initiative to systematically declassify andreclassify whole areas of information on nuclear testing, the production ofnuclear materials and other subjects also drew criticism.208 The aim was to openup nuclear weapons policy, engage the public on the state of the productioncomplex, and lift the veil of Cold War secrecy and move the Department ofEnergy into a new era of government openness.209 This sparked opposition fromCongress and led to accusations that DOE was taking a strong anti-nuclearweapons stance from outside and inside the administration.210 In 1994, forexample, O Leary came under fire from Deputy Secretary of Defense JohnDeutch for not providing sufficient funds for nuclear weapons activities.211These criticisms were reflected in a number of important reports that lam-basted the management, purpose and direction of the SSP, the warhead LEPsand the consolidation and modernisation of the complex under DOE.The 1994Task Force on Alternative Futures for the National Laboratories examinedoptions for change within DOE s national laboratories, particularly the Depart-ment s three nuclear weapons laboratories and produced the Galvin Report;212the 1996 Commission on Maintaining United States Nuclear Weapons Expertisedeveloped a plan for recruiting and retaining nuclear weapons expertise withinDOE and led to the Chiles Commission report in 1999;213 and a study of DOE smanagement of the nuclear weapons programme was commissioned from theInstitute for Defense Analysis in 1997, also known as the 120-day study.214 Allthree reports criticised DOE and highlighted poor management and the import-ance of retaining nuclear weapons expertise.The 1998 Defense Science Board sTask Force on Nuclear Deterrence also criticised the administration for havingno long-term plan for the nuclear arsenal and a 1999 study by the JASON groupof nuclear scientists concluded that there was little evidence of an overall planfor long-term production needs under the SSP.215At the end of the 1990s Congress concluded that DOE s handling of thenuclear mission was not improving and that change required Congressionalintervention.Representative Thornberry, for example, stated in 1999 that 54 Nuclear policy under Bill ClintonOne of the things that is broken is the organizational structure and manage-ment of the nuclear weapons complex in the Department of Energy.Studyafter study, report after report, commission after commission have foundthat DOE s management of our nuclear weapons program has been amess.216In 1999 Congress directed DOD and DOE to produce a comprehensive NuclearMission Management Plan to ensure the long-term viability of the R&D andmanufacturing infrastructure for strategic nuclear systems and a plan to retaincore nuclear weapons expertise [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]