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.9It is evident that Monluc was drawing on a number of recent examplesof successful militancy in this blueprint, including the initiatives imple-mented by the reformed synods, the experiences of the syndicate atBordeaux and the coalition at Agen, and his personal preference forharnessing the potential of the community rather than relying on externaltroops to defend a locality, a trademark of his organizational skills duringthe Italian campaigns of the 1550s.Monluc now ordered the ordinance tobe published simultaneously in all neighbouring towns, and soon Quercy,Périgueux, Casteljaloux and Condom had signed an accord promisingmutual cooperation.By disseminating the regulations, Monluc waspromoting a sense of unification and interdependence among dispersedCatholic communities, thereby creating a quasi politico-military allianceacross the region.This is an important point, for, while the edict ofAmboise would censure the confederation within two months, its successin circulating the schematics for concerted activism, and in formingconnections and defining relations that would allow Catholic militants todraw on a broader support base than ever before, were highly significantachievements.So, while Monluc would dismantle the physical manifesta-tions of the confederation in April 1562, its legacy would remain intactfor years, allowing Catholics to defend the Agenais in more depth andwith more effectiveness than previously.10To what extent were reformers and moderate royal officials able toresist this inexorable march towards Catholic hegemony at Agen? Oneoption was to promote bipartisan government across the Agenais.Thiswas now a real possibility, as a clause within the Amboise edict dictatedthat any Protestant consuls ejected from office during the wars should befree to return, and that chambres mi-parties should be installed within allprésidial courts.But if this was supposed to usher in a new era of confes-sional relations, it did quite the opposite at Agen, choking présidial pro-cedure and causing bureaucratic chaos as Catholic, moderate andProtestant officials splintered into factions.Competition centred on two9[Monluc], Commentaires et lettres, IV, pp.190 95.10Monluc wrote to Catherine de Medici in April 1563 that he had ended the confedera-tion at Agen.See [Monluc], Commentaires et lettres, IV, p.205. 100 CATHOLIC ACTIVISM IN SOUTH-WEST FRANCE, 1540 1570groups: the Catholic party, headed by the lieutenant-criminel, Antoine deTholon, and the pro-reform delegation, led by the juge-mage, Herman deSevin.Their agendas were quite different.Catholics sought to prosecutethose guilty of attacks on their clergy and community over the previousmonths, while Protestants attempted to recoup the sums and propertyconfiscated by the coalition.The result saw little accomplished by eithergroup, as appeals and counter-claims were simply redirected so as to findfavour in the judgement of sympathetic mi-partie judges.11Relations deteriorated further when Lalande, recently promoted to thegovernorship of Agen by Monluc, complained to the crown that orderlygovernance of the town was impossible while Protestant judges continuedto deliver biased judgements.12 Sevin pulled no punches in his retort,reminding Lalande that Catholics no longer monopolized jurisdiction atAgen, and, consequently, the jurade should stay out of mi-partie affairs.The juge-mage then launched an attack on Monluc s confirmation ofLalande as governor, claiming it to have been a clear abuse of power, asthe exercising of military prerogatives over civil jurisdiction had beenterminated following the March peace edict, and demanded that a newgovernor be appointed, thoughtfully suggesting several highly placedProtestant nobles for the office.13 This was not the new era of peace andharmony hoped for by the crown.In fact, in the immediate months after the Amboise edict, tensions rosequite dramatically across the Agenais, resulting in episodes of sporadicviolence between the faiths.In May 1563, Monluc informed Catherine deMedici that he had evidence of a Protestant plot to assault Agen, andurged Lalande to place the guard on twenty-four hour alert as a precau-tion.Lalande re-formed the conseil militaire and alerted the Agenaisétats, who met the following month to discuss the nobility s response tothe worsening situation.14 The minutes of this assembly are revealing.Theétats openly endorsed the administration of Monluc and Lalande, butdemanded that an inquiry be held into the bias and mismanagement ofSevin and his Protestant consuls.15 An investigation was duly launchedand found Sevin guilty as charged, though this is hardly surprising giventhat the prosecutor was Estienne Thibault, a leading force in the Agencoalition over the past year.16 Tholin suggested that the Catholic party11Tholin, La ville d Agen , XIV, p.217.12ADLG, E Sup.Agen, EE 56 (June 1563).Lalande was appointed governor of Agen on17 April 1563: ADLG, E Sup.Agen, EE 56 (17 April 1563).13Tholin, La ville d Agen , XIV, p.217.See also ADLG, E Sup.Agen, FF 32 (no folio).14[Monluc], Commentaires et lettres, IV, pp.255 62.15ADLG, E Sup.Agen, EE 56 (28 June 1563).16ADLG, E Sup.Agen, GG 201, fo.3. THE DEFENCE OF AGEN 101had no option other than to move against Sevin at this point so as toprotect Lalande, whose governorship was continually being questionedby Protestant remonstrations.17 That Catholics pooled and employedtheir full resources to effect this decision is reminiscent of affairs atBordeaux, where Catholic magistrates united to minimize the attacks bymoderate voices within the parlement on Lange and the syndicate.Bycontrast with Bordeaux, though, where Lagebâton had successfullydeflected Catholic attacks, the Agen coalition, now supported by Monlucand the états, was victorious.But Sevin had fled to Paris long before the verdict was delivered, and soescaped punishment.In his absence, contention within the chambers ofthe jurade, présidial and sénéchaussée was minimized, and the Agenaisexperienced a temporary lull in confessional tensions.The only majorincident stemmed from the decision of the reformed synod of the Agenaisin mid-1565 to employ full-time ministers for its temples at Sainte-Foy,Clairac, Tonneins and Nérac.Lalande argued that such appointmentswere illegal and, fearing they would raise the temperature across theprovince, recalled Monluc to Agen as a precaution.18 When a large armscache was discovered at Tonneins, and numerous skirmishes werereported across the countryside, Catholic leaders were forced to considertheir next move carefully.19 The coalition spent September and Octoberweighing up their options, before settling on a plan of action.Lalandedetermined that, as Agen was the priority both for Catholics and forProtestants, any major confrontation would be centred on the town.Hethus set about bolstering its defensive strength [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]
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.9It is evident that Monluc was drawing on a number of recent examplesof successful militancy in this blueprint, including the initiatives imple-mented by the reformed synods, the experiences of the syndicate atBordeaux and the coalition at Agen, and his personal preference forharnessing the potential of the community rather than relying on externaltroops to defend a locality, a trademark of his organizational skills duringthe Italian campaigns of the 1550s.Monluc now ordered the ordinance tobe published simultaneously in all neighbouring towns, and soon Quercy,Périgueux, Casteljaloux and Condom had signed an accord promisingmutual cooperation.By disseminating the regulations, Monluc waspromoting a sense of unification and interdependence among dispersedCatholic communities, thereby creating a quasi politico-military allianceacross the region.This is an important point, for, while the edict ofAmboise would censure the confederation within two months, its successin circulating the schematics for concerted activism, and in formingconnections and defining relations that would allow Catholic militants todraw on a broader support base than ever before, were highly significantachievements.So, while Monluc would dismantle the physical manifesta-tions of the confederation in April 1562, its legacy would remain intactfor years, allowing Catholics to defend the Agenais in more depth andwith more effectiveness than previously.10To what extent were reformers and moderate royal officials able toresist this inexorable march towards Catholic hegemony at Agen? Oneoption was to promote bipartisan government across the Agenais.Thiswas now a real possibility, as a clause within the Amboise edict dictatedthat any Protestant consuls ejected from office during the wars should befree to return, and that chambres mi-parties should be installed within allprésidial courts.But if this was supposed to usher in a new era of confes-sional relations, it did quite the opposite at Agen, choking présidial pro-cedure and causing bureaucratic chaos as Catholic, moderate andProtestant officials splintered into factions.Competition centred on two9[Monluc], Commentaires et lettres, IV, pp.190 95.10Monluc wrote to Catherine de Medici in April 1563 that he had ended the confedera-tion at Agen.See [Monluc], Commentaires et lettres, IV, p.205. 100 CATHOLIC ACTIVISM IN SOUTH-WEST FRANCE, 1540 1570groups: the Catholic party, headed by the lieutenant-criminel, Antoine deTholon, and the pro-reform delegation, led by the juge-mage, Herman deSevin.Their agendas were quite different.Catholics sought to prosecutethose guilty of attacks on their clergy and community over the previousmonths, while Protestants attempted to recoup the sums and propertyconfiscated by the coalition.The result saw little accomplished by eithergroup, as appeals and counter-claims were simply redirected so as to findfavour in the judgement of sympathetic mi-partie judges.11Relations deteriorated further when Lalande, recently promoted to thegovernorship of Agen by Monluc, complained to the crown that orderlygovernance of the town was impossible while Protestant judges continuedto deliver biased judgements.12 Sevin pulled no punches in his retort,reminding Lalande that Catholics no longer monopolized jurisdiction atAgen, and, consequently, the jurade should stay out of mi-partie affairs.The juge-mage then launched an attack on Monluc s confirmation ofLalande as governor, claiming it to have been a clear abuse of power, asthe exercising of military prerogatives over civil jurisdiction had beenterminated following the March peace edict, and demanded that a newgovernor be appointed, thoughtfully suggesting several highly placedProtestant nobles for the office.13 This was not the new era of peace andharmony hoped for by the crown.In fact, in the immediate months after the Amboise edict, tensions rosequite dramatically across the Agenais, resulting in episodes of sporadicviolence between the faiths.In May 1563, Monluc informed Catherine deMedici that he had evidence of a Protestant plot to assault Agen, andurged Lalande to place the guard on twenty-four hour alert as a precau-tion.Lalande re-formed the conseil militaire and alerted the Agenaisétats, who met the following month to discuss the nobility s response tothe worsening situation.14 The minutes of this assembly are revealing.Theétats openly endorsed the administration of Monluc and Lalande, butdemanded that an inquiry be held into the bias and mismanagement ofSevin and his Protestant consuls.15 An investigation was duly launchedand found Sevin guilty as charged, though this is hardly surprising giventhat the prosecutor was Estienne Thibault, a leading force in the Agencoalition over the past year.16 Tholin suggested that the Catholic party11Tholin, La ville d Agen , XIV, p.217.12ADLG, E Sup.Agen, EE 56 (June 1563).Lalande was appointed governor of Agen on17 April 1563: ADLG, E Sup.Agen, EE 56 (17 April 1563).13Tholin, La ville d Agen , XIV, p.217.See also ADLG, E Sup.Agen, FF 32 (no folio).14[Monluc], Commentaires et lettres, IV, pp.255 62.15ADLG, E Sup.Agen, EE 56 (28 June 1563).16ADLG, E Sup.Agen, GG 201, fo.3. THE DEFENCE OF AGEN 101had no option other than to move against Sevin at this point so as toprotect Lalande, whose governorship was continually being questionedby Protestant remonstrations.17 That Catholics pooled and employedtheir full resources to effect this decision is reminiscent of affairs atBordeaux, where Catholic magistrates united to minimize the attacks bymoderate voices within the parlement on Lange and the syndicate.Bycontrast with Bordeaux, though, where Lagebâton had successfullydeflected Catholic attacks, the Agen coalition, now supported by Monlucand the états, was victorious.But Sevin had fled to Paris long before the verdict was delivered, and soescaped punishment.In his absence, contention within the chambers ofthe jurade, présidial and sénéchaussée was minimized, and the Agenaisexperienced a temporary lull in confessional tensions.The only majorincident stemmed from the decision of the reformed synod of the Agenaisin mid-1565 to employ full-time ministers for its temples at Sainte-Foy,Clairac, Tonneins and Nérac.Lalande argued that such appointmentswere illegal and, fearing they would raise the temperature across theprovince, recalled Monluc to Agen as a precaution.18 When a large armscache was discovered at Tonneins, and numerous skirmishes werereported across the countryside, Catholic leaders were forced to considertheir next move carefully.19 The coalition spent September and Octoberweighing up their options, before settling on a plan of action.Lalandedetermined that, as Agen was the priority both for Catholics and forProtestants, any major confrontation would be centred on the town.Hethus set about bolstering its defensive strength [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]