[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.The only armoured division that was still deployed inthe peninsula was redeployed along the Suez Canal, continuing a trend of dilutingtheir forces along the Israeli Egyptian border that had started earlier.50 Furthermore,when Nasser received reports about the possible implications of an Israeli war againsthim, he did not hide his surprise: Could it be that Israel really wanted war? If so, hecould not see why & What is it all about? 51It took Nasser and the Egyptian army high command quite a time to understandthat Israel was attacking, and the attack was not yet another limited retaliation.Nasser s reaction to the Israeli attack was somewhat restrained, but his rhetoric haddefinitely changed.Shortly after the war, he explained to the American Ambassadorin Cairo, Henry Byroade, that before the war, Egypt was only country in Arab world49 Yigal Sheffy, Unconcern at Dawn, Surprise at Sunset: Egyptian IntelligenceAppreciation before the Sinai Campaign, 1956 , Intelligence and National Security, 5/3(1990): 10.50 Ibid., p.24.51 Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, 29 October 1956,FRUS, 1955 57, vol.XVI (Washington, DC, 1990), p.827;. The 1956 Sinai War 147where people were not particularly interested in Israeli problem.But today popularindifference has given way to hate. 52 The change was manifested in the growinganti-Israeli rhetoric employed by Nasser in the following years, a kind of rhetoric hedid not use before the 1956 war.Now he started explaining how Arab unity meansthe liquidation of Israel and the Arab people will pronounce the death sentenceagainst Israel, namely disappearance.53 That kind of rhetoric reflected a state ofmind that could explain why Nasser initiated the June 1967 crisis, and even more,it can explain the inflammatory rhetoric he was using during those days of waitingbefore war erupted on 5 June 1967.***For Israel, Arab hostility and threatening intentions was a given.It took the Israelismany years to be able not only to see the shades and complexities in the Arabattitude towards Israel, but also to realize that just as the Israelis saw the Arabsas constantly conspiring against them, the Arab leaders and people held the sameview towards Israel and its intentions towards the Arabs.The Israeli attack onEgypt in 1956 was nothing other than proof for the Arab leaders and people of thatIsraeli trait.For Nasser, there was no reason for the Israeli attack whatsoever.Thesituation along the border with Israel, at least since April 1956, was exceptionallyquiet, and in any case, as far as we can tell, Nasser had no aggressive intentionstowards Israel.The gap between Nasser s perception of Israel s intentions andIsrael s reading of Egyptian intentions can be measured almost in terms of Greektragedy.Israel s misconception was not devoid of any sense of reality: after all,it was just few years ago that Egyptian troops, Nasser among them, launcheda military campaign aiming to prevent the establishment of the state of Israel,and the continuing border clashes and raids required a kind of perception andunderstanding that most Israelis, including Ben-Gurion, did not possess.It was thetragic set of events that made the Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956 such a significantmoment in the history of the Arab Israeli conflict, as it perpetuated Israel s imageas an aggressive and expansionist state whose presence in the region jeopardizedthe security of its Arab neighbours.It was this perspective that deepened andescalated the conflict, paving the way for the next round, which turned out to beeven more fateful.52 Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, 16 December,1956, FRUS, 1955 57, vol.XVI, p.1317;.53 Harkabi, Arab Attitudes to Israel, pp.1 13. This page intentionally left blank Chapter 10When Did Nasser Expect War?The Suez Nationalization and itsAftermath in EgyptLaura M.JamesIntroductionNasser s nationalization of the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956 was an iconicmoment in modern Egyptian history, but the precise timing and motivation of hisdecision have long been disputed.The move is often said to have been a snap reactionto the US withdrawal of funding for the Aswan Dam on 19 July.However, thischapter argues that, although there is evidence of two years advance preparation,the immediate trigger was the precise wording of the US statement withdrawing thepromise of funds, which owing to the intensity of Egyptian perceptions of Westernhostility was seen as a direct attack on the Cairo regime.As the crisis developed inAugust and September, Nasser ruled out the possibility of war, retaining his initialbelief that his enemies would be restrained by external factors.Thus Egypt neglectedindications that Israel might attack and ignored Anglo-French preparations [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.The only armoured division that was still deployed inthe peninsula was redeployed along the Suez Canal, continuing a trend of dilutingtheir forces along the Israeli Egyptian border that had started earlier.50 Furthermore,when Nasser received reports about the possible implications of an Israeli war againsthim, he did not hide his surprise: Could it be that Israel really wanted war? If so, hecould not see why & What is it all about? 51It took Nasser and the Egyptian army high command quite a time to understandthat Israel was attacking, and the attack was not yet another limited retaliation.Nasser s reaction to the Israeli attack was somewhat restrained, but his rhetoric haddefinitely changed.Shortly after the war, he explained to the American Ambassadorin Cairo, Henry Byroade, that before the war, Egypt was only country in Arab world49 Yigal Sheffy, Unconcern at Dawn, Surprise at Sunset: Egyptian IntelligenceAppreciation before the Sinai Campaign, 1956 , Intelligence and National Security, 5/3(1990): 10.50 Ibid., p.24.51 Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, 29 October 1956,FRUS, 1955 57, vol.XVI (Washington, DC, 1990), p.827;. The 1956 Sinai War 147where people were not particularly interested in Israeli problem.But today popularindifference has given way to hate. 52 The change was manifested in the growinganti-Israeli rhetoric employed by Nasser in the following years, a kind of rhetoric hedid not use before the 1956 war.Now he started explaining how Arab unity meansthe liquidation of Israel and the Arab people will pronounce the death sentenceagainst Israel, namely disappearance.53 That kind of rhetoric reflected a state ofmind that could explain why Nasser initiated the June 1967 crisis, and even more,it can explain the inflammatory rhetoric he was using during those days of waitingbefore war erupted on 5 June 1967.***For Israel, Arab hostility and threatening intentions was a given.It took the Israelismany years to be able not only to see the shades and complexities in the Arabattitude towards Israel, but also to realize that just as the Israelis saw the Arabsas constantly conspiring against them, the Arab leaders and people held the sameview towards Israel and its intentions towards the Arabs.The Israeli attack onEgypt in 1956 was nothing other than proof for the Arab leaders and people of thatIsraeli trait.For Nasser, there was no reason for the Israeli attack whatsoever.Thesituation along the border with Israel, at least since April 1956, was exceptionallyquiet, and in any case, as far as we can tell, Nasser had no aggressive intentionstowards Israel.The gap between Nasser s perception of Israel s intentions andIsrael s reading of Egyptian intentions can be measured almost in terms of Greektragedy.Israel s misconception was not devoid of any sense of reality: after all,it was just few years ago that Egyptian troops, Nasser among them, launcheda military campaign aiming to prevent the establishment of the state of Israel,and the continuing border clashes and raids required a kind of perception andunderstanding that most Israelis, including Ben-Gurion, did not possess.It was thetragic set of events that made the Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956 such a significantmoment in the history of the Arab Israeli conflict, as it perpetuated Israel s imageas an aggressive and expansionist state whose presence in the region jeopardizedthe security of its Arab neighbours.It was this perspective that deepened andescalated the conflict, paving the way for the next round, which turned out to beeven more fateful.52 Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, 16 December,1956, FRUS, 1955 57, vol.XVI, p.1317;.53 Harkabi, Arab Attitudes to Israel, pp.1 13. This page intentionally left blank Chapter 10When Did Nasser Expect War?The Suez Nationalization and itsAftermath in EgyptLaura M.JamesIntroductionNasser s nationalization of the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956 was an iconicmoment in modern Egyptian history, but the precise timing and motivation of hisdecision have long been disputed.The move is often said to have been a snap reactionto the US withdrawal of funding for the Aswan Dam on 19 July.However, thischapter argues that, although there is evidence of two years advance preparation,the immediate trigger was the precise wording of the US statement withdrawing thepromise of funds, which owing to the intensity of Egyptian perceptions of Westernhostility was seen as a direct attack on the Cairo regime.As the crisis developed inAugust and September, Nasser ruled out the possibility of war, retaining his initialbelief that his enemies would be restrained by external factors.Thus Egypt neglectedindications that Israel might attack and ignored Anglo-French preparations [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]