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.McClel-lan and the officers under his command were completely bam-boozled.All the action against Porter would not have mattered ifMcClellan had not misjudged the strength of the enemy directlyin front of him.On the evening of June 27, McClellan had evenwired Secretary of War Edwin Stanton to inform him that he hadbeen attacked by greatly superior numbers from both sides ofthe Chickahominy River, reports historian James McPherson.Although the Seven Days battles were not over yet, Gen-eral McClellan was already thinking like a defeated commander.He had more men, had taken fewer casualties in two days thanLee, and could have pushed Magruder out of the way at anymoment.The failure was McClellan s, but he blamed everyoneand everything else.Four hours after his telegram to Stanton,the Union commander sent an angry, frustrated follow-up, re-called by James McPherson: I have lost this battle because myforce was too small.The Government has not sustained thisarmy.If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe nothanks to you or to any other persons in Washington.You havedone your best to sacrifice this army. Fortunately for McClel-lan, perhaps, his full message never reached Stanton.A colonelin the telegraph office in Washington removed the last two linesfrom the general s telegram before handing the wire to Secre-tary Stanton. The Seven Days 51Robert E.Lee exploited the weaknesses of his Union opponent, General GeorgeMcClellan, a cautious leader who was reluctant to take risks in war.Although Leemanaged to eliminate the threat of Federal occupation of Richmond, the Southernwar hero lost an estimated 8,700 soldiers, more than double the number of Unionsoldiers.Above, injured Union soldiers from the Battle of Gaines Mill sit on a flatbedrailcar awaiting transport to the nearest hospital.June 28 was spent moving around forces on both sides.On June 29, with all his men south of the Chickahominy, Leeattacked.He hit McClellan s rear guard, commanded by MajorGeneral Edwin Vose Sumner s 2nd Corps.Sumner s forces wereat Savage s Station, 3 miles (5 km) south of the river, along theRichmond & York River Railroad, due east of Richmond.Aragged fight broke out, and Lee suffered from poor maps, badgeography, strong Union resistance, and failures by Magruder,who did not attack with full strength.In addition, once again,Stonewall Jackson spent much of the day having his troopsrebuild a bridge rather than send his men to the battle.The 52 CIVIL WAR BATTLESresult was a Confederate assault that was disorganized and half-hearted.Sumner was able to hold his ground.In part, his menfought to protect a Union hospital near Savage s Station whereseveral thousand Federal troops lay wounded and sick.And yet,McClellan ordered Sumner to abandon his positions, leavingthe hospital s 2,500 occupants as prisoners of war.FROM GLENDALE TO SAVAGE S STATIONLee did not lose a day this time, choosing to bear down on Mc-Clellan.His rather complicated plan called for coordinated as-saults by seven Rebel divisions outside the crossroads hamletof Glendale, several miles southeast of Savage s Station.Lee be-lieved that, if he could take Glendale and control the crossroads,he could split McClellan s forces just as the Chickahominy had.Then he could defeat the larger of the two halves.But, onceagain, coordination failed as only two divisions one headedby Longstreet and the other by Daniel Harvey D.H. Hill werepushed into the battle against five Union divisions.Incredibly, Jackson again failed to enter the fight as fully asexpected.At one point during the battle, Jackson actually tooka nap! Jackson s failure to really engage the enemy that day was complete, disastrous, and unredeemable, notes historian Clif-ford Dowdey in his book The Seven Days.Again, the battle didnot get going until late in the day.But the fighting on June 30 would prove key to the SevenDays.The battle would be remembered by various namesGlendale, White Oak Swamp, Frayser s Farm, as well as severalothers.Federal troops fought hard for the crossroads and man-aged to hold out long enough to keep their positions.They didso even as McClellan, once more, shockingly ordered anotherretreat to the south toward Harrison s Landing on the banks ofthe James River.Lee finished the day frustrated.He had pushedthe Union forces farther south, away from Richmond, but hadlost another opportunity to crush McClellan s army.After days The Seven Days 53of heavy fighting, Lee now found himself facing an enemy thathad moved repeatedly out of good defenses only to take upsome of its best field positions yet.UP MALVERN HILLMalvern Hill stands 3 miles (5 km) south of Glendale, not farfrom the northern banks of the James River.It was an ideal po-sition on which to make a stand, and the Federals knew it.Thehill rose 150 feet (45 meters) in height and lay between two longravines sitting a mile (1.5 km) apart.The only option for a com-mander who desperately wanted to fight the Union Army wasto approach the hill in a direct frontal assault.This would placeLee s forces out in the open with McClellan s men occupying thehigh ground.From those heights, Union cannons could con-centrate their deadly fire on the enemy.In all, four Union divi-sions backed with 100 artillery pieces were in position beforethe battle began, with an additional 150 guns waiting to taketheir places.Lee had a decision to make.He could send his men upMalvern Hill or wait the enemy out.Lee would not wait.Heand Jackson met early that morning to decide where to posi-tion Rebel cannons to maximize their firepower.But it was allfor nothing [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.McClel-lan and the officers under his command were completely bam-boozled.All the action against Porter would not have mattered ifMcClellan had not misjudged the strength of the enemy directlyin front of him.On the evening of June 27, McClellan had evenwired Secretary of War Edwin Stanton to inform him that he hadbeen attacked by greatly superior numbers from both sides ofthe Chickahominy River, reports historian James McPherson.Although the Seven Days battles were not over yet, Gen-eral McClellan was already thinking like a defeated commander.He had more men, had taken fewer casualties in two days thanLee, and could have pushed Magruder out of the way at anymoment.The failure was McClellan s, but he blamed everyoneand everything else.Four hours after his telegram to Stanton,the Union commander sent an angry, frustrated follow-up, re-called by James McPherson: I have lost this battle because myforce was too small.The Government has not sustained thisarmy.If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe nothanks to you or to any other persons in Washington.You havedone your best to sacrifice this army. Fortunately for McClel-lan, perhaps, his full message never reached Stanton.A colonelin the telegraph office in Washington removed the last two linesfrom the general s telegram before handing the wire to Secre-tary Stanton. The Seven Days 51Robert E.Lee exploited the weaknesses of his Union opponent, General GeorgeMcClellan, a cautious leader who was reluctant to take risks in war.Although Leemanaged to eliminate the threat of Federal occupation of Richmond, the Southernwar hero lost an estimated 8,700 soldiers, more than double the number of Unionsoldiers.Above, injured Union soldiers from the Battle of Gaines Mill sit on a flatbedrailcar awaiting transport to the nearest hospital.June 28 was spent moving around forces on both sides.On June 29, with all his men south of the Chickahominy, Leeattacked.He hit McClellan s rear guard, commanded by MajorGeneral Edwin Vose Sumner s 2nd Corps.Sumner s forces wereat Savage s Station, 3 miles (5 km) south of the river, along theRichmond & York River Railroad, due east of Richmond.Aragged fight broke out, and Lee suffered from poor maps, badgeography, strong Union resistance, and failures by Magruder,who did not attack with full strength.In addition, once again,Stonewall Jackson spent much of the day having his troopsrebuild a bridge rather than send his men to the battle.The 52 CIVIL WAR BATTLESresult was a Confederate assault that was disorganized and half-hearted.Sumner was able to hold his ground.In part, his menfought to protect a Union hospital near Savage s Station whereseveral thousand Federal troops lay wounded and sick.And yet,McClellan ordered Sumner to abandon his positions, leavingthe hospital s 2,500 occupants as prisoners of war.FROM GLENDALE TO SAVAGE S STATIONLee did not lose a day this time, choosing to bear down on Mc-Clellan.His rather complicated plan called for coordinated as-saults by seven Rebel divisions outside the crossroads hamletof Glendale, several miles southeast of Savage s Station.Lee be-lieved that, if he could take Glendale and control the crossroads,he could split McClellan s forces just as the Chickahominy had.Then he could defeat the larger of the two halves.But, onceagain, coordination failed as only two divisions one headedby Longstreet and the other by Daniel Harvey D.H. Hill werepushed into the battle against five Union divisions.Incredibly, Jackson again failed to enter the fight as fully asexpected.At one point during the battle, Jackson actually tooka nap! Jackson s failure to really engage the enemy that day was complete, disastrous, and unredeemable, notes historian Clif-ford Dowdey in his book The Seven Days.Again, the battle didnot get going until late in the day.But the fighting on June 30 would prove key to the SevenDays.The battle would be remembered by various namesGlendale, White Oak Swamp, Frayser s Farm, as well as severalothers.Federal troops fought hard for the crossroads and man-aged to hold out long enough to keep their positions.They didso even as McClellan, once more, shockingly ordered anotherretreat to the south toward Harrison s Landing on the banks ofthe James River.Lee finished the day frustrated.He had pushedthe Union forces farther south, away from Richmond, but hadlost another opportunity to crush McClellan s army.After days The Seven Days 53of heavy fighting, Lee now found himself facing an enemy thathad moved repeatedly out of good defenses only to take upsome of its best field positions yet.UP MALVERN HILLMalvern Hill stands 3 miles (5 km) south of Glendale, not farfrom the northern banks of the James River.It was an ideal po-sition on which to make a stand, and the Federals knew it.Thehill rose 150 feet (45 meters) in height and lay between two longravines sitting a mile (1.5 km) apart.The only option for a com-mander who desperately wanted to fight the Union Army wasto approach the hill in a direct frontal assault.This would placeLee s forces out in the open with McClellan s men occupying thehigh ground.From those heights, Union cannons could con-centrate their deadly fire on the enemy.In all, four Union divi-sions backed with 100 artillery pieces were in position beforethe battle began, with an additional 150 guns waiting to taketheir places.Lee had a decision to make.He could send his men upMalvern Hill or wait the enemy out.Lee would not wait.Heand Jackson met early that morning to decide where to posi-tion Rebel cannons to maximize their firepower.But it was allfor nothing [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]