[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.But, distance and dis-trust (or at least a healthy skepticism) are also needed if spy catch-ers are to practice their craft effectively and the damage caused byspies is to be minimized.Espionage and the Nature ofWorld PoliticsThere is disagreement on the fundamental nature of world poli-tics.Realists see world politics as an arena in which states strug-gle to survive by acquiring and managing power.In their viewthe game of world politics is played with few rules.Internationallaw, pubic opinion, and the promises of other states count for lit-tle.Sovereignty is the key concept, and, by definition, this meansthat there exists no source of authority above the state.In the real-ist view, the only rules of world politics are those agreed upon bystates and that states can enforce.Self-reliance and self-protectionare the highest values.Liberals view world politics through a neo-Wilsonian lens.They see the root causes of conflict as lying less in the basic natureof world politics as in flawed policies and flawed individuals.Inparticular, they reject policies that stress balancing power andzero-sum approaches to promoting security.Where realists tendto see promoting the national interest and promoting the globalinterest as incompatible goals, liberals see no inherent tension.Promoting democracy, building international institutions, linkingpeople through free trade, and respecting fundamental humanrights are viewed as providing a solid foundation for a successfulforeign policy. 48 Understanding the Contemporary Espionage DebateRealism and liberalism are not the only perspectives fromwhich world politics can be studied.Many scholars also employdependency theory, feminism, globalism, and postmodernism asthe starting point for their studies.Regardless of which perspec-tive is used, one of the fundamental problems that must beexplained is why states cooperate.Again, realists and liberalstend to put forward different answers.Liberals stress the impor-tance of absolute gains: states will cooperate as long as theyimprove their position in some absolute sense.Realists stress theimportance of relative gains: states will only cooperate when theycan improve their position relative to an adversary.Agreement between the two positions does exist, however, ata more fundamental level.Both agree that a major obstacle tocooperation is uncertainty.It is uncertainty over what can begained by cooperating.It is uncertainty over whether the otherstates can be trusted.It is uncertainty over what the motives arebehind the actions of the other states.The starting point for over-coming uncertainty and increasing the predictability of the actionsof other states is the acquisition of information about them.Espio-nage is a means of doing so, but given the deceit and potentiallytreasonous nature of the act, it is also one surrounded by ambiva-lence (Stein 1990).International law recognizes the central role played by espi-onage in information gathering in times of war.As far back as theDeclaration of Brussels of 1874, espionage has been considered tobe a lawful means of warfare.Its unique nature has also been rec-ognized.Spies, for example, need to be captured in the act of spy-ing in order to be convicted.A spy who flees the country he or shewas spying in and returns to his or her homeland is not consid-ered to be a spy any longer.This is different from a criminal, whoremains a criminal until captured.If captured in the act of spying,however, international law supports denying a spy certain rightsand privileges that would otherwise be afforded to peoplecharged with a crime.The peacetime status of espionage is lessclear.Some international law scholars treat espionage as illegal intimes of peace.It is seen as a violation of sovereignty and thepolitical independence of states.Others see it as a morally, politi-cally, and legally acceptable activity (Demerest 1996).The distinction between wartime and peacetime espionage islosing its theoretical and practical importance.The formal decla-ration of war is becoming an anachronism.World War II was thelast declared war the United States participated in.Korea, Espionage and Surprise 49Vietnam, the Persian Gulf War, peacekeeping operations inKosovo and Lebanon, Grenada, and the war against terrorismhave all been conducted without an official declaration of war.Inoperational terms the boundary between peace and war is alsofading.During the Cold War the United States and Soviet Unionconsidered themselves to be in a state of warfare short of actualcombat but one that included military, political, and diplomaticcompetition and conflict.The foreign policies of many lesserstates, especially those locked into rivalry wars such as thosebetween India and Pakistan and Israel and its Arab neighbors,also do not make a distinction between war and peace.Nowhereis the boundary between war and peace more blurred and illdefined than in the case of terrorism.As the events of 9/11 reveal,successful antiterrorist policy making depends upon information,but the collection and analysis of information cannot wait untilthe terrorist act has taken place.It must precede it and take placeduring times of peace.Espionage and SurpriseOn any given day there is little reason for policymakers to expectthe unexpected when taking an inventory of the state of theworld.Bureaucratic inertia, domestic political pressures, vestedpersonal interests, and constraints imposed by other states andexisting policies conspire to prevent much more than incrementalchange from taking place.The normal solution to a stubborndiplomatic or military problem is to undertake a new initiative.On close inspection, however, that new initiative is generally lit-tle more than a variation on an old theme.But, surprise does happen.At 3:00 A.M.on June 22, 1941, 151German divisions supported by some 3,500 tanks and 1,800 air-craft caught the world by surprise and crossed into the SovietUnion.In its first four weeks Operation BARBAROSSA swept across400 miles and closed in on Moscow.By midsummer, Germanforces had conquered an area twice the size of France.TheJapanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, was equallyspectacular in its results.The United States suffered the severedamage or loss of eight battleships, three light cruisers, four otherships, and 188 planes, and it suffered 3,435 casualties.On July 15,1971, in less than ninety seconds, President Richard Nixon star-tled the world when he announced that he would soon make a 50 Understanding the Contemporary Espionage Debatevisit to the People s Republic of China, bringing an end to morethan two decades of diplomatic isolation and hostility betweenthese two states (Betts 1982).In and of itself, surprise is not important, though.As Hitler sinvasion of Russia and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor illus-trate, surprise, no matter how great, does not guarantee victory [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl centka.pev.pl
.But, distance and dis-trust (or at least a healthy skepticism) are also needed if spy catch-ers are to practice their craft effectively and the damage caused byspies is to be minimized.Espionage and the Nature ofWorld PoliticsThere is disagreement on the fundamental nature of world poli-tics.Realists see world politics as an arena in which states strug-gle to survive by acquiring and managing power.In their viewthe game of world politics is played with few rules.Internationallaw, pubic opinion, and the promises of other states count for lit-tle.Sovereignty is the key concept, and, by definition, this meansthat there exists no source of authority above the state.In the real-ist view, the only rules of world politics are those agreed upon bystates and that states can enforce.Self-reliance and self-protectionare the highest values.Liberals view world politics through a neo-Wilsonian lens.They see the root causes of conflict as lying less in the basic natureof world politics as in flawed policies and flawed individuals.Inparticular, they reject policies that stress balancing power andzero-sum approaches to promoting security.Where realists tendto see promoting the national interest and promoting the globalinterest as incompatible goals, liberals see no inherent tension.Promoting democracy, building international institutions, linkingpeople through free trade, and respecting fundamental humanrights are viewed as providing a solid foundation for a successfulforeign policy. 48 Understanding the Contemporary Espionage DebateRealism and liberalism are not the only perspectives fromwhich world politics can be studied.Many scholars also employdependency theory, feminism, globalism, and postmodernism asthe starting point for their studies.Regardless of which perspec-tive is used, one of the fundamental problems that must beexplained is why states cooperate.Again, realists and liberalstend to put forward different answers.Liberals stress the impor-tance of absolute gains: states will cooperate as long as theyimprove their position in some absolute sense.Realists stress theimportance of relative gains: states will only cooperate when theycan improve their position relative to an adversary.Agreement between the two positions does exist, however, ata more fundamental level.Both agree that a major obstacle tocooperation is uncertainty.It is uncertainty over what can begained by cooperating.It is uncertainty over whether the otherstates can be trusted.It is uncertainty over what the motives arebehind the actions of the other states.The starting point for over-coming uncertainty and increasing the predictability of the actionsof other states is the acquisition of information about them.Espio-nage is a means of doing so, but given the deceit and potentiallytreasonous nature of the act, it is also one surrounded by ambiva-lence (Stein 1990).International law recognizes the central role played by espi-onage in information gathering in times of war.As far back as theDeclaration of Brussels of 1874, espionage has been considered tobe a lawful means of warfare.Its unique nature has also been rec-ognized.Spies, for example, need to be captured in the act of spy-ing in order to be convicted.A spy who flees the country he or shewas spying in and returns to his or her homeland is not consid-ered to be a spy any longer.This is different from a criminal, whoremains a criminal until captured.If captured in the act of spying,however, international law supports denying a spy certain rightsand privileges that would otherwise be afforded to peoplecharged with a crime.The peacetime status of espionage is lessclear.Some international law scholars treat espionage as illegal intimes of peace.It is seen as a violation of sovereignty and thepolitical independence of states.Others see it as a morally, politi-cally, and legally acceptable activity (Demerest 1996).The distinction between wartime and peacetime espionage islosing its theoretical and practical importance.The formal decla-ration of war is becoming an anachronism.World War II was thelast declared war the United States participated in.Korea, Espionage and Surprise 49Vietnam, the Persian Gulf War, peacekeeping operations inKosovo and Lebanon, Grenada, and the war against terrorismhave all been conducted without an official declaration of war.Inoperational terms the boundary between peace and war is alsofading.During the Cold War the United States and Soviet Unionconsidered themselves to be in a state of warfare short of actualcombat but one that included military, political, and diplomaticcompetition and conflict.The foreign policies of many lesserstates, especially those locked into rivalry wars such as thosebetween India and Pakistan and Israel and its Arab neighbors,also do not make a distinction between war and peace.Nowhereis the boundary between war and peace more blurred and illdefined than in the case of terrorism.As the events of 9/11 reveal,successful antiterrorist policy making depends upon information,but the collection and analysis of information cannot wait untilthe terrorist act has taken place.It must precede it and take placeduring times of peace.Espionage and SurpriseOn any given day there is little reason for policymakers to expectthe unexpected when taking an inventory of the state of theworld.Bureaucratic inertia, domestic political pressures, vestedpersonal interests, and constraints imposed by other states andexisting policies conspire to prevent much more than incrementalchange from taking place.The normal solution to a stubborndiplomatic or military problem is to undertake a new initiative.On close inspection, however, that new initiative is generally lit-tle more than a variation on an old theme.But, surprise does happen.At 3:00 A.M.on June 22, 1941, 151German divisions supported by some 3,500 tanks and 1,800 air-craft caught the world by surprise and crossed into the SovietUnion.In its first four weeks Operation BARBAROSSA swept across400 miles and closed in on Moscow.By midsummer, Germanforces had conquered an area twice the size of France.TheJapanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, was equallyspectacular in its results.The United States suffered the severedamage or loss of eight battleships, three light cruisers, four otherships, and 188 planes, and it suffered 3,435 casualties.On July 15,1971, in less than ninety seconds, President Richard Nixon star-tled the world when he announced that he would soon make a 50 Understanding the Contemporary Espionage Debatevisit to the People s Republic of China, bringing an end to morethan two decades of diplomatic isolation and hostility betweenthese two states (Betts 1982).In and of itself, surprise is not important, though.As Hitler sinvasion of Russia and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor illus-trate, surprise, no matter how great, does not guarantee victory [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]