[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.In addition to the latest troop cuts,Khrushchev raised the possibility of withdrawing Soviet forces from Hungary andPoland.He went so far as to recommend replacing his country s huge standing armyby territorial militia a horrifying prospect for the Soviet generals that would havealso spelled the end of any military purpose of the Warsaw Pact.39The PCC meeting ended on a sour note when Chinese observer Kang Sheng, act-ing on Mao Zedong s special instructions, challenged Khrushchev s rosy view of theinternational situation and the propriety of his policies.Kang alleged an undimin-ished threat of U.S. imperialism and, in view of the communist world s rising power,the need to confront it by force rather than conciliation.His speech and its publica-tion in Beijing over Soviet protests marked further deterioration of Sino-Soviet rela-tions after Khrushchev s fruitless efforts to keep China within the Soviet fold.Thesehad reportedly included an attempt the preceding June to lure it into the Warsaw37Record of Khrushchev Gomułka conversation, November 10, 1958, KC PZPR 2631, pp.449 462, at p.453, AAN.Jeremi Suri, America s Search for a Technological Solution to the ArmsRace: The Surprise Attack Conference of 1958 and a Challenge for Eisenhower Revisionists , Diplomatic History 21 (1977): 417 51.38Draft of non-aggression treaty prepared by Warsaw Pact conference of foreign ministers,May 27 28, 1959, DY/30, 3392, SAPMO.Oleg Grinevskij, Tauwetter: Entspannung, Krisen und neueEiszeit (Berlin: Siedler, 1996), pp.273 74.Memorandum by Khrushchev to party presidium, Dec-ember 8, 1959, Cold War International History Project Bulletin 8 9 (1996 97): 418 20, at p.418.Vladislav M.Zubok, Khrushchev s 1960 Troop Cut: New Russian Evidence, ibid., pp.416 18.39Report on the PCC meeting by Anton Iugov to Bulgarian party presidium, February 11, 1960,F.1-B, Op.5, A.E.415, l.3-17, TsDA.Czechoslovak report on the meeting, February 20, 1960,AV KS 02/2 249/332, SA.Also on PHP website, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/col-lection_3/PCC_meetings/coll_3_PCC_1960.htm.14 Pact at his meeting with defense minister Marshal Peng Dehuai, who had managedto sidetrack it before falling out of Mao s favor, ironically, on suspicion of collusionwith Moscow.40Khrushchev s optimism began to falter once he realized that he had misjudgedU.S.readiness to yield on Berlin, and eventually gave way to anger, prompting himto scuttle the May 1960 Paris summit with Eisenhower after an American U-2 spyplane had been shot down over Soviet territory.As the Berlin confrontation startedescalating, the consequences for the Warsaw Pact were profound, if largely unin-tended, having been brought about less by design than by the dynamics of a con-frontation spinning out of control.They entailed transformation of the alliance fromthe primarily political tool used by Khrushchev as an accessory to his unorthodoxdiplomacy into a potential military instrument for use in a conflict with NATO, aswell as a more effective mechanism for managing the allies a task more topical nowthat the risk of the conflict increased.Even before Khrushchev s gratuitous provocation of the Berlin crisis, the Sovietgeneral staff had begun to harness Eastern European armies for war, yet withoutsubstantial changes in the essentially defensive strategy inherited from the Stalin era.Occasional exercises held under the auspices of the Warsaw Pact in the presence ofits supreme commander, Konev, were still organized on a bilateral rather than mul-tilateral basis.Czechoslovakia was the bellwether of strategic changes because of itsparticular position as a country that bordered directly on NATO territory yet hadno Soviet forces stationed on its soil.41As late as April 1960, Soviet officials still unequivocally emphasized that inview of the political situation presumably one conducive to a satisfactory Berlinsettlement the Czechoslovak army was not to be equipped with ground-to-groundbut only ground-to-air missiles, meaning defensive rather than offensive arms.Sixmonths later, however, the decision was reversed, with an amendment to its long-term procurement program providing for the reception of a variety of hardware formainly offensive use, notably tactical missiles capable of carrying Soviet nuclear war-heads.The Berlin crisis had begun escalating precisely during those six months.42The Soviet military chafed under Khrushchev s pressure for troop reductions.Hisrelationship with Konev a World War II veteran notorious for his profligate use of40Speech by Kang Sheng, February 4, 1960, KC PZPR, 2662/421-34, AAN.Also at http://-www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/collection_11/docs/speech_040260.pdf.The Peng Dehuai episodein Lorenz M.Lthi, The Sino-Soviet Split, unpublished Ph.D.dissertation, Yale University, 2003,p.130, citing Liu Xiao, Chushi Sulian banian [Eight Years as Ambassador to the Soviet Union](Beijing: Dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1998), pp.109 111.41Documents Nos.7, 15.and 21.42 Zprva o nvrhu zm%1łn v plnu vstavby SLA na lta 1961 1965 [Report on the Prop-osed Changes in the Development Plan of the Czechoslovak People s Army for 1961 1965], No-vember 19, 1960, VS, OS (OL), krab.7, %0ń.j.39030/19, VA. Prob%1łh informace n%0ńelnka gen-erlnho atbu o dosledcch konsultace [Information by the Chief of General Staff on theConsequences of the Consultation], October 15, 1960, G`-OS, 1960, 0039030/22, VA.The nuclearwarheads remained stored on Soviet territory but could be brought into Czechoslovakia and fittedon the missiles there within 48 hours.15 troops in combat was particularly bad.In July 1960, Khrushchev replaced him byMarshal Andrei A.Grechko as the Warsaw Pact s supreme commander.He expect-ed Grechko, respected as a professional as well as a disciplinarian, to remain loyalwrongly, as it would turn out four years later when Grechko would join the con-spiracy against Khrushchev.For the time being, however, the generals were kept inline more than what could be said about the Eastern European allies.43Albania the most remote of the allied states because of its lack of a commonborder with any of the others began to defy Moscow in 1960 for reasons that remainobscure.Soviet overtures toward Yugoslavia, a neighbor with a recent history ofdesigns on Albanian independence, undoubtedly played a role, as did Soviet arro-gance in dealing with a country Stalin used to cite as an epitome of insignificance.Inany case, Albanians took to harassing Soviet military personnel at the Vlor navalbase the Warsaw Pact s strategic outpost in the Mediterranean.Khrushchev plot-ted without success to topple the Albanian leader, Enver Hoxha, who then retaliat-ed by insulting him at Moscow conference of communist parties in November, accus-ing him of an unwillingness to consult and other improprieties.The Warsaw Pact hadnot yet been built, and it had already started to crumble.44The March 1961 session of the PCC was, in contrast to the preceding one, an emer-gency meeting.Hoxha s defense minister, Beqir Balluku, had responded insolentlyto Grechko s protest against Albanian abuses of Soviet sailors.Khrushchev com-plained that the Vlor base was no longer operational, thus damaging the WarsawPact s military capability.Although the committee dutifully condemned Albania sbehavior the situation subsequently got worse rather than better, leaving the SovietUnion no choice but to withdraw most of its ships from the base while the Albanianssnatched some of the submarines. I trusted them, Khrushchev later fumed. Whowould have thought that after all that they got from us they would spit in our face!Only pirates act like that.Evidently they have it in their blood, after their ances-tors [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
zanotowane.pl doc.pisz.pl pdf.pisz.pl centka.pev.pl
.In addition to the latest troop cuts,Khrushchev raised the possibility of withdrawing Soviet forces from Hungary andPoland.He went so far as to recommend replacing his country s huge standing armyby territorial militia a horrifying prospect for the Soviet generals that would havealso spelled the end of any military purpose of the Warsaw Pact.39The PCC meeting ended on a sour note when Chinese observer Kang Sheng, act-ing on Mao Zedong s special instructions, challenged Khrushchev s rosy view of theinternational situation and the propriety of his policies.Kang alleged an undimin-ished threat of U.S. imperialism and, in view of the communist world s rising power,the need to confront it by force rather than conciliation.His speech and its publica-tion in Beijing over Soviet protests marked further deterioration of Sino-Soviet rela-tions after Khrushchev s fruitless efforts to keep China within the Soviet fold.Thesehad reportedly included an attempt the preceding June to lure it into the Warsaw37Record of Khrushchev Gomułka conversation, November 10, 1958, KC PZPR 2631, pp.449 462, at p.453, AAN.Jeremi Suri, America s Search for a Technological Solution to the ArmsRace: The Surprise Attack Conference of 1958 and a Challenge for Eisenhower Revisionists , Diplomatic History 21 (1977): 417 51.38Draft of non-aggression treaty prepared by Warsaw Pact conference of foreign ministers,May 27 28, 1959, DY/30, 3392, SAPMO.Oleg Grinevskij, Tauwetter: Entspannung, Krisen und neueEiszeit (Berlin: Siedler, 1996), pp.273 74.Memorandum by Khrushchev to party presidium, Dec-ember 8, 1959, Cold War International History Project Bulletin 8 9 (1996 97): 418 20, at p.418.Vladislav M.Zubok, Khrushchev s 1960 Troop Cut: New Russian Evidence, ibid., pp.416 18.39Report on the PCC meeting by Anton Iugov to Bulgarian party presidium, February 11, 1960,F.1-B, Op.5, A.E.415, l.3-17, TsDA.Czechoslovak report on the meeting, February 20, 1960,AV KS 02/2 249/332, SA.Also on PHP website, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/col-lection_3/PCC_meetings/coll_3_PCC_1960.htm.14 Pact at his meeting with defense minister Marshal Peng Dehuai, who had managedto sidetrack it before falling out of Mao s favor, ironically, on suspicion of collusionwith Moscow.40Khrushchev s optimism began to falter once he realized that he had misjudgedU.S.readiness to yield on Berlin, and eventually gave way to anger, prompting himto scuttle the May 1960 Paris summit with Eisenhower after an American U-2 spyplane had been shot down over Soviet territory.As the Berlin confrontation startedescalating, the consequences for the Warsaw Pact were profound, if largely unin-tended, having been brought about less by design than by the dynamics of a con-frontation spinning out of control.They entailed transformation of the alliance fromthe primarily political tool used by Khrushchev as an accessory to his unorthodoxdiplomacy into a potential military instrument for use in a conflict with NATO, aswell as a more effective mechanism for managing the allies a task more topical nowthat the risk of the conflict increased.Even before Khrushchev s gratuitous provocation of the Berlin crisis, the Sovietgeneral staff had begun to harness Eastern European armies for war, yet withoutsubstantial changes in the essentially defensive strategy inherited from the Stalin era.Occasional exercises held under the auspices of the Warsaw Pact in the presence ofits supreme commander, Konev, were still organized on a bilateral rather than mul-tilateral basis.Czechoslovakia was the bellwether of strategic changes because of itsparticular position as a country that bordered directly on NATO territory yet hadno Soviet forces stationed on its soil.41As late as April 1960, Soviet officials still unequivocally emphasized that inview of the political situation presumably one conducive to a satisfactory Berlinsettlement the Czechoslovak army was not to be equipped with ground-to-groundbut only ground-to-air missiles, meaning defensive rather than offensive arms.Sixmonths later, however, the decision was reversed, with an amendment to its long-term procurement program providing for the reception of a variety of hardware formainly offensive use, notably tactical missiles capable of carrying Soviet nuclear war-heads.The Berlin crisis had begun escalating precisely during those six months.42The Soviet military chafed under Khrushchev s pressure for troop reductions.Hisrelationship with Konev a World War II veteran notorious for his profligate use of40Speech by Kang Sheng, February 4, 1960, KC PZPR, 2662/421-34, AAN.Also at http://-www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/collection_11/docs/speech_040260.pdf.The Peng Dehuai episodein Lorenz M.Lthi, The Sino-Soviet Split, unpublished Ph.D.dissertation, Yale University, 2003,p.130, citing Liu Xiao, Chushi Sulian banian [Eight Years as Ambassador to the Soviet Union](Beijing: Dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1998), pp.109 111.41Documents Nos.7, 15.and 21.42 Zprva o nvrhu zm%1łn v plnu vstavby SLA na lta 1961 1965 [Report on the Prop-osed Changes in the Development Plan of the Czechoslovak People s Army for 1961 1965], No-vember 19, 1960, VS, OS (OL), krab.7, %0ń.j.39030/19, VA. Prob%1łh informace n%0ńelnka gen-erlnho atbu o dosledcch konsultace [Information by the Chief of General Staff on theConsequences of the Consultation], October 15, 1960, G`-OS, 1960, 0039030/22, VA.The nuclearwarheads remained stored on Soviet territory but could be brought into Czechoslovakia and fittedon the missiles there within 48 hours.15 troops in combat was particularly bad.In July 1960, Khrushchev replaced him byMarshal Andrei A.Grechko as the Warsaw Pact s supreme commander.He expect-ed Grechko, respected as a professional as well as a disciplinarian, to remain loyalwrongly, as it would turn out four years later when Grechko would join the con-spiracy against Khrushchev.For the time being, however, the generals were kept inline more than what could be said about the Eastern European allies.43Albania the most remote of the allied states because of its lack of a commonborder with any of the others began to defy Moscow in 1960 for reasons that remainobscure.Soviet overtures toward Yugoslavia, a neighbor with a recent history ofdesigns on Albanian independence, undoubtedly played a role, as did Soviet arro-gance in dealing with a country Stalin used to cite as an epitome of insignificance.Inany case, Albanians took to harassing Soviet military personnel at the Vlor navalbase the Warsaw Pact s strategic outpost in the Mediterranean.Khrushchev plot-ted without success to topple the Albanian leader, Enver Hoxha, who then retaliat-ed by insulting him at Moscow conference of communist parties in November, accus-ing him of an unwillingness to consult and other improprieties.The Warsaw Pact hadnot yet been built, and it had already started to crumble.44The March 1961 session of the PCC was, in contrast to the preceding one, an emer-gency meeting.Hoxha s defense minister, Beqir Balluku, had responded insolentlyto Grechko s protest against Albanian abuses of Soviet sailors.Khrushchev com-plained that the Vlor base was no longer operational, thus damaging the WarsawPact s military capability.Although the committee dutifully condemned Albania sbehavior the situation subsequently got worse rather than better, leaving the SovietUnion no choice but to withdraw most of its ships from the base while the Albanianssnatched some of the submarines. I trusted them, Khrushchev later fumed. Whowould have thought that after all that they got from us they would spit in our face!Only pirates act like that.Evidently they have it in their blood, after their ances-tors [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]