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.It is tempting to say it is an attitude to life that is akin to typicalattitudes to the representation of life in art.But it s not clear that thesuspension of moral evaluation is invited by artistic representation assuch.Nor is it clear that this attitude only makes an appearance in relationto ways of living which are like that of Nietzsche s nobles too remote toserve as models for us, though it may be more appropriate here thanelsewhere: after all, if one can paint a stirring scene in which the eye isdrawn away from morally problematic features, one can paint oneself into ittoo.This brings me back to bovarysme: not, admittedly, the strategic bovarysme of trying to live one s whole life according to a narrative plan, butthe more tactical bovarysme of Eliot s dramatizing oneself against one senvironment (1934: 40).But if Nietzsche does exemplify this sensibility and I have hardly argued for that here he is surely only one of a great manyto have done so.Accordingly the proper investigation of this sensibility andits relevance to moral philosophy I leave to another occasion. chapter 13Nietzsche and the virtues of mature egoismChristine Swanton(i ) introducti onA major obstacle to reading Nietzsche as a philosopher who has somethingto offer substantive moral theory is his self-ascriptions as both an immoralistand an egoist.1 I overcome this obstacle by understanding Nietzsche sconception of virtues of character as those of the mature egoist. I focusthe discussion on the virtues of mature egoism (and correlative vices) asportrayed in GM, but Nietzsche s conception of the mature egoist underliesall his central works in ethics.Indeed the core ideas of mature egoism areintroduced in works other than GM.Much has been written about the sense in which Nietzsche is an immor-alist, and its compatibility with a kind of morality, albeit a revisionary one.2However, an uneasy feeling remains that the sense in which he is amoralist is distinctly unattractive to modern moral sensibilities for, accord-ing to Nietzsche, the true morality is a form of egoism:.we shall restore to men their goodwill towards the actions decried as egoistic andrestore to these actions their value we shall deprive them of their bad conscience! (D, 148)I shall not dispute that Nietzsche s ethics is a kind of egoism.What I shalldispute, particularly in relation to GM, is that the kind of egoism heespouses is unattractive.Due to the focus on GM, I cannot in this chapterdeal with all salient passages apparently confirming the interpretation of1I use the Cambridge (Diethe 1994) translation of GM (with page references), though I very occasion-ally refer to the Smith translation (see below).Other translations are as follows: The Antichrist, trans.Walter Kaufmann (1976a); Twilight of the Idols, trans.Walter Kaufman (1976b); Daybreak, trans.R.J.Hollingdale (1982b); Untimely Meditations, trans.R.J.Hollingdale (1983), Essay II, On the Uses andDisadvantages of History for Life ; Human, All Too Human, trans.Marion Faber with StephenLehmann (1984); Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, trans.R.J.Hollingdale(1990a); and On the Genealogy of Morals, trans.Douglas Smith (1996).2For what might be called explicitly compatibilist readings see, for example, Bergman 1988: 29 45,Solomon 1973: 202 25, and Schacht 1973: 58 82 and 1983: 466 75.285 286 christine swantonNietzsche s ethics as unattractive: passages such as those apparently endors-ing cruelty and exploitation in BGE and A.3My argument has the following general structure.What is needed is aproper understanding of the kind of egoism endorsed by Nietzsche.Inparticular, I claim, his kind of egoism is what he calls a mature egoism, tobe contrasted with a number of forms of immaturity: the immature egoismof instant gratification, an unsocialized egoism, and the kind of altruism inwhich the self wilts away (TI, Skirmishes of an Untimely Man, 36).I donot argue that what is to moral sensibilities unattractive should (counter-intuitively) be regarded as attractive, necessitating a wholesale revision ofour moral intuitions.Rather I show that Nietzsche s sophisticated psycho-logically insightful account of various virtues and vices is compelling, eventhough on a superficial understanding he apparently endorses what wewould regard as an immoral form of egoism.The central features of a mature egoist are to be found in a passage headed The Three Phases of Morality until Now in HAH, I:The first sign that an animal has become human is that his behavior is no longerdirected to his momentary comfort, but rather to his enduring comfort, that iswhen man becomes useful, expedient: then for the first time the free rule of reasonbursts forth.A still higher state is reached when man acts according to the principleof honor, by means of which he finds his place in society, submitting to commonlyheld feelings; that raises him high above the phase in which he is guided only bypersonal usefulness.Now he shows and wants to be shown respect; that is heunderstands his advantage as dependent on his opinion of others and their opinionof him.Finally, at the highest stage of morality until now he acts according tohis standard of things and men; he himself determines for himself and others whatis honorable, what is profitable.He has become the lawgiver of opinions, inaccordance with the ever more refined concept of usefulness and honor [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.It is tempting to say it is an attitude to life that is akin to typicalattitudes to the representation of life in art.But it s not clear that thesuspension of moral evaluation is invited by artistic representation assuch.Nor is it clear that this attitude only makes an appearance in relationto ways of living which are like that of Nietzsche s nobles too remote toserve as models for us, though it may be more appropriate here thanelsewhere: after all, if one can paint a stirring scene in which the eye isdrawn away from morally problematic features, one can paint oneself into ittoo.This brings me back to bovarysme: not, admittedly, the strategic bovarysme of trying to live one s whole life according to a narrative plan, butthe more tactical bovarysme of Eliot s dramatizing oneself against one senvironment (1934: 40).But if Nietzsche does exemplify this sensibility and I have hardly argued for that here he is surely only one of a great manyto have done so.Accordingly the proper investigation of this sensibility andits relevance to moral philosophy I leave to another occasion. chapter 13Nietzsche and the virtues of mature egoismChristine Swanton(i ) introducti onA major obstacle to reading Nietzsche as a philosopher who has somethingto offer substantive moral theory is his self-ascriptions as both an immoralistand an egoist.1 I overcome this obstacle by understanding Nietzsche sconception of virtues of character as those of the mature egoist. I focusthe discussion on the virtues of mature egoism (and correlative vices) asportrayed in GM, but Nietzsche s conception of the mature egoist underliesall his central works in ethics.Indeed the core ideas of mature egoism areintroduced in works other than GM.Much has been written about the sense in which Nietzsche is an immor-alist, and its compatibility with a kind of morality, albeit a revisionary one.2However, an uneasy feeling remains that the sense in which he is amoralist is distinctly unattractive to modern moral sensibilities for, accord-ing to Nietzsche, the true morality is a form of egoism:.we shall restore to men their goodwill towards the actions decried as egoistic andrestore to these actions their value we shall deprive them of their bad conscience! (D, 148)I shall not dispute that Nietzsche s ethics is a kind of egoism.What I shalldispute, particularly in relation to GM, is that the kind of egoism heespouses is unattractive.Due to the focus on GM, I cannot in this chapterdeal with all salient passages apparently confirming the interpretation of1I use the Cambridge (Diethe 1994) translation of GM (with page references), though I very occasion-ally refer to the Smith translation (see below).Other translations are as follows: The Antichrist, trans.Walter Kaufmann (1976a); Twilight of the Idols, trans.Walter Kaufman (1976b); Daybreak, trans.R.J.Hollingdale (1982b); Untimely Meditations, trans.R.J.Hollingdale (1983), Essay II, On the Uses andDisadvantages of History for Life ; Human, All Too Human, trans.Marion Faber with StephenLehmann (1984); Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, trans.R.J.Hollingdale(1990a); and On the Genealogy of Morals, trans.Douglas Smith (1996).2For what might be called explicitly compatibilist readings see, for example, Bergman 1988: 29 45,Solomon 1973: 202 25, and Schacht 1973: 58 82 and 1983: 466 75.285 286 christine swantonNietzsche s ethics as unattractive: passages such as those apparently endors-ing cruelty and exploitation in BGE and A.3My argument has the following general structure.What is needed is aproper understanding of the kind of egoism endorsed by Nietzsche.Inparticular, I claim, his kind of egoism is what he calls a mature egoism, tobe contrasted with a number of forms of immaturity: the immature egoismof instant gratification, an unsocialized egoism, and the kind of altruism inwhich the self wilts away (TI, Skirmishes of an Untimely Man, 36).I donot argue that what is to moral sensibilities unattractive should (counter-intuitively) be regarded as attractive, necessitating a wholesale revision ofour moral intuitions.Rather I show that Nietzsche s sophisticated psycho-logically insightful account of various virtues and vices is compelling, eventhough on a superficial understanding he apparently endorses what wewould regard as an immoral form of egoism.The central features of a mature egoist are to be found in a passage headed The Three Phases of Morality until Now in HAH, I:The first sign that an animal has become human is that his behavior is no longerdirected to his momentary comfort, but rather to his enduring comfort, that iswhen man becomes useful, expedient: then for the first time the free rule of reasonbursts forth.A still higher state is reached when man acts according to the principleof honor, by means of which he finds his place in society, submitting to commonlyheld feelings; that raises him high above the phase in which he is guided only bypersonal usefulness.Now he shows and wants to be shown respect; that is heunderstands his advantage as dependent on his opinion of others and their opinionof him.Finally, at the highest stage of morality until now he acts according tohis standard of things and men; he himself determines for himself and others whatis honorable, what is profitable.He has become the lawgiver of opinions, inaccordance with the ever more refined concept of usefulness and honor [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]