[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.During a 2003 meeting, the two leaders formally agreed to worktogether on democratic development, economic reform, anticorruption, and trade andinvestment ties.President Bush also announced the establishment of an initiative that provided$157 million in education assistance to Indonesia over five years.However, it was the 2004 election of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a highly regarded retiredgeneral and graduate of the IMET program, that provided a substantial boost to U.S.-Indonesiaties.In the first half of 2005, the Bush administration restored IMET assistance and nonlethalforeign military sales, and it issued a national security waiver in November that authorizedforeign military financing and defense exports, essentially reestablishing normal military-to-military relations.(Congressional restrictions remained only on assistance to the Army s specialforces [Kopassus] and the National Police s special forces unit [BRIMOB]).The rapid andmassive U.S.-led humanitarian response to the December 2004 tsunami, which killed more than200,000 people in Indonesia s Aceh province alone, demonstrated the commitment of the UnitedStates to aid Indonesians in their time of need.The U.S.immediate military response and the1The term Jemaah Islamiya may be translated as Islamic congregation, a generic phrase thatcompounded the difficulty of censuring the group.indonesia | 47 subsequent outpouring of support from private U.S.citizens to aid reconstruction provided atleast a temporary surge in positive sentiment toward the United States.Nonetheless, a residue ofresentment and mistrust of the United States, within the Indonesian establishment and populace,remains today.Traditional Indonesian Foreign PolicySince the 1940s, Indonesia has espoused an independent and active foreign policy that puts apremium on maintaining sovereign independence, free from external influence over itspolicymaking, and on remaining engaged actively in global affairs to shape a more just andpeaceful world.At the same time, its conception of its foreign policy interests has conformed towhat analysts refer to as a concentric circle concept, in which Indonesia pays priority attentionfirst to relations with closest neighbors, then moves steadily outward.Since the Suharto era, the viability of ASEAN and relations with ASEAN members has beenforemost in Indonesia s strategic calculations and has formed the first concentric circle.ASEANhistorically has been the primary vehicle for Indonesia to promote its interests and preventexternal interference in its affairs.During the Suharto years, Indonesia saw itself as ASEAN snatural leader.The economic crisis beginning in 1997 and subsequent political turmoil distractedIndonesian leaders from the grouping for much of the next decade, but in recent years Jakarta hasreasserted its leadership role as one way to assert itself as a major international player.Indeed, theIndonesian foreign policy establishment instinctively orients itself toward ASEAN whenconsidering its international strategy and interests.Indonesia s commitment to ASEAN also reflects its broader commitment to multilateralism as thepreferred method of international engagement to embed nations in a constraining web of rulesand consultative procedures.Indeed, Indonesia has sought to assert the interests of the developingworld through cooperation with like-minded nations in multilateral institutions such as the Non-Aligned Movement, Organization of the Islamic Conference, G-77, and the United Nations.Indonesia s inclusion in the G-20 process offers a new vehicle for multilateral cooperation thattakes Indonesia out of the developing world context and into an arena of major global powers.The second concentric circle, as traditionally defined, includes those just outside ASEAN: thenations of Northeast Asia and Oceania (Australia, New Zealand, Pacific Islands), and vehiclessuch as the ASEAN + 3 (China, Japan, Korea) process.The next circle traditionally includes theUnited States and the European Union, its major economic partners.Muslim IdentityDespite its status as the world s largest Muslim-majority nation, Suharto s Indonesia did notaccentuate its Muslim identity at home or abroad until the early 1990s due to concerns aboutdomestic stability, particularly in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution in 1979.Indonesia sawan upsurge in religious consciousness beginning in the 1980s, however, leading Suharto to try latein his reign to co-opt the movement by wrapping himself in the mantle of Islamism.Indonesia s48 | u.s.alliances and emerging partnerships in southeast asia media began to cover unrest in the Middle East more closely, for instance, leading to heightenedawareness and outrage over perceived abuses against Palestinians.U.S.-led wars in Iraq andAfghanistan also received heightened coverage, although other Islamic causes, such as Kashmir,receive little attention, reflecting the selectivity of Indonesian popular and media interest.Overall, Islamic solidarity is an important factor in Indonesian foreign policy, often coloringIndonesian policies and perspectives, including toward the United States.FindingsIndonesian officials are generally satisfied with the state and trajectory of U.S.-Indonesiarelations, but their perspectives on a partnership with the United States remain complicated byconflicting attitudes toward U.S.international policies and their own traditional foreign policyinstincts.The government of Indonesia has indicated a clear interest in stronger and deeperties with the United States.In a speech in Washington, D.C., in November 2008, PresidentYudhoyono called for a 21st century strategic partnership. Interlocutors in Jakarta echoedthe president s call for such a relationship with the United States and referred to the speechwhen asked how they would define the concept.In the speech, Yudhoyono was vague on thespecifics, instead outlining the principles under which a strategic partnership must beconcluded [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.During a 2003 meeting, the two leaders formally agreed to worktogether on democratic development, economic reform, anticorruption, and trade andinvestment ties.President Bush also announced the establishment of an initiative that provided$157 million in education assistance to Indonesia over five years.However, it was the 2004 election of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a highly regarded retiredgeneral and graduate of the IMET program, that provided a substantial boost to U.S.-Indonesiaties.In the first half of 2005, the Bush administration restored IMET assistance and nonlethalforeign military sales, and it issued a national security waiver in November that authorizedforeign military financing and defense exports, essentially reestablishing normal military-to-military relations.(Congressional restrictions remained only on assistance to the Army s specialforces [Kopassus] and the National Police s special forces unit [BRIMOB]).The rapid andmassive U.S.-led humanitarian response to the December 2004 tsunami, which killed more than200,000 people in Indonesia s Aceh province alone, demonstrated the commitment of the UnitedStates to aid Indonesians in their time of need.The U.S.immediate military response and the1The term Jemaah Islamiya may be translated as Islamic congregation, a generic phrase thatcompounded the difficulty of censuring the group.indonesia | 47 subsequent outpouring of support from private U.S.citizens to aid reconstruction provided atleast a temporary surge in positive sentiment toward the United States.Nonetheless, a residue ofresentment and mistrust of the United States, within the Indonesian establishment and populace,remains today.Traditional Indonesian Foreign PolicySince the 1940s, Indonesia has espoused an independent and active foreign policy that puts apremium on maintaining sovereign independence, free from external influence over itspolicymaking, and on remaining engaged actively in global affairs to shape a more just andpeaceful world.At the same time, its conception of its foreign policy interests has conformed towhat analysts refer to as a concentric circle concept, in which Indonesia pays priority attentionfirst to relations with closest neighbors, then moves steadily outward.Since the Suharto era, the viability of ASEAN and relations with ASEAN members has beenforemost in Indonesia s strategic calculations and has formed the first concentric circle.ASEANhistorically has been the primary vehicle for Indonesia to promote its interests and preventexternal interference in its affairs.During the Suharto years, Indonesia saw itself as ASEAN snatural leader.The economic crisis beginning in 1997 and subsequent political turmoil distractedIndonesian leaders from the grouping for much of the next decade, but in recent years Jakarta hasreasserted its leadership role as one way to assert itself as a major international player.Indeed, theIndonesian foreign policy establishment instinctively orients itself toward ASEAN whenconsidering its international strategy and interests.Indonesia s commitment to ASEAN also reflects its broader commitment to multilateralism as thepreferred method of international engagement to embed nations in a constraining web of rulesand consultative procedures.Indeed, Indonesia has sought to assert the interests of the developingworld through cooperation with like-minded nations in multilateral institutions such as the Non-Aligned Movement, Organization of the Islamic Conference, G-77, and the United Nations.Indonesia s inclusion in the G-20 process offers a new vehicle for multilateral cooperation thattakes Indonesia out of the developing world context and into an arena of major global powers.The second concentric circle, as traditionally defined, includes those just outside ASEAN: thenations of Northeast Asia and Oceania (Australia, New Zealand, Pacific Islands), and vehiclessuch as the ASEAN + 3 (China, Japan, Korea) process.The next circle traditionally includes theUnited States and the European Union, its major economic partners.Muslim IdentityDespite its status as the world s largest Muslim-majority nation, Suharto s Indonesia did notaccentuate its Muslim identity at home or abroad until the early 1990s due to concerns aboutdomestic stability, particularly in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution in 1979.Indonesia sawan upsurge in religious consciousness beginning in the 1980s, however, leading Suharto to try latein his reign to co-opt the movement by wrapping himself in the mantle of Islamism.Indonesia s48 | u.s.alliances and emerging partnerships in southeast asia media began to cover unrest in the Middle East more closely, for instance, leading to heightenedawareness and outrage over perceived abuses against Palestinians.U.S.-led wars in Iraq andAfghanistan also received heightened coverage, although other Islamic causes, such as Kashmir,receive little attention, reflecting the selectivity of Indonesian popular and media interest.Overall, Islamic solidarity is an important factor in Indonesian foreign policy, often coloringIndonesian policies and perspectives, including toward the United States.FindingsIndonesian officials are generally satisfied with the state and trajectory of U.S.-Indonesiarelations, but their perspectives on a partnership with the United States remain complicated byconflicting attitudes toward U.S.international policies and their own traditional foreign policyinstincts.The government of Indonesia has indicated a clear interest in stronger and deeperties with the United States.In a speech in Washington, D.C., in November 2008, PresidentYudhoyono called for a 21st century strategic partnership. Interlocutors in Jakarta echoedthe president s call for such a relationship with the United States and referred to the speechwhen asked how they would define the concept.In the speech, Yudhoyono was vague on thespecifics, instead outlining the principles under which a strategic partnership must beconcluded [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]