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.28 It was, in short, the epitome of avirtual national community , not only in the eyes of its producers butalso, it would seem, for millions of loyal listeners.But if the Wunschkonzert was highly effective at boosting nationalmorale, other developments in radio broadcasting threatened to under-mine it.Ever since its inception the German broadcasting system suf-fered from the inefficiencies of its federal structure, in which the nineFigure 8.3 Soldiers stationed in Austria enjoying a 3-mal Wunschkonzertshow, 12 February 1941Source: Courtesy of Bildarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz. Radio, Film and Morale 165regional companies filled around half of airtime in their respectivebroadcasting areas.Given the wartime demand for technical personneland resources, it was only a matter of time before programming struc-tures would undergo a significant overhaul.The broadcasting systemwas thus duly amalgamated on 9 July 1940 into a single, standardizedReich-wide radio programme.The problem was that such savings aswere made came at the expense of a huge reduction in choice for listen-ers, which threatened to undermine the very popularity of radio itself.Although officials soon moved to a dual programme for part of the day,which gave listeners a choice of at least two programmes, this still rep-resented a significant reduction of variety on the preceding system.29Broadcasters thus found themselves in an awkward position.Whereasthe Nazi leadership regarded radio as the single most important conduitbetween regime and populace, the standardization of the programmemade it more difficult to fulfil this mission.The pressures this gener-ated all pointed in one direction: since maximizing the number of lis-teners by offering a choice of programming was no longer feasible, theonly solution was to cater unambiguously to the majority.In practice,what this boiled down to was a further expansion of light entertain-ment at the expense of Kultur.Over the winter and spring of 19401941, amid rising concerns about the popularity of the BBC amongGerman soldiers (which prompted the launch of the soldiers stationRadio Belgrade in April 1941, whose cheery tone was highly popularamong civilians too30), there were mounting calls for a more entertain-ing national programme.These calls grew all the louder over summerand autumn 1941 as popular anxieties surrounding the invasion ofthe Soviet Union (in particular the elusiveness of victory in spite ofrepeated proclamations that the Russians were on their last legs) beganto undermine confidence in the official news sources.The fact thatthe radio programme underwent its most far-reaching overhaul duringautumn and winter 1941 1942, just when the German war effort beganto encounter serious problems, was thus no coincidence.As the stringof military triumphs began to dwindle, and as the thrill of victory couldno longer pull in the audience by itself, it became increasingly apparentthat the most promising means of binding listeners to the radio wasto provide light entertainment.When the revamped programme wasrolled out in October it reportedly met with almost universal approval.The shift of the programme towards almost exclusively cheerful andlight broadcasts is highly conspicuous.31 The blatantly populist tonethat would dominate Nazi wartime radio was subsequently buttressedby the restructuring of the Reich Broadcasting Company in February 166 Corey Ross1942.Just as the regime became more vicious and tyrannical than ever,it also became more concerned with listening pleasure.The agony of defeatYet by early 1942 no amount of entertainment could halt the risingtide of distrust.32 Although this rarely manifested itself in the form ofopen dissent, the growing sense of scepticism nonetheless signalleda fundamental change of mood.As the news gradually turned bad,propaganda officials, filmmakers and broadcasters increasingly shiftedthe emphasis away from triumphalist renditions of topical themestowards more escapist forms of entertainment as a means of maintain-ing morale.How far this was deliberately intended to distract attentionfrom military failures and how far it was a response to changing audi-ences expectations is difficult to say.It is in all events worth notingthat audience figures remained extraordinarily high, reaching recordlevels during the second half of the war.But this strategy nonethelessentailed certain trade-offs, for the resort to escapist amusements threat-ened to unravel the very sense of collective purpose that the mediahad helped to fabricate over the previous several years.As the hopes forfinal victory gradually succumbed to Allied bombs and Soviet guns, theenthralling combination of self-gratification and national mobilizationfrom the early war years began to separate.More and more, pleasure-seeking became just that.What is important to recognize is that this shift in the relation-ship between mobilization and distraction did not reduce demand forentertainment per se.Quite the opposite: while popular trust in thenews declined, light entertainment was more sought after than ever.Audience figures alone leave little doubt about this.Radio ownershipreached a peak in 1943 with 16,179,000 registered sets, or 190 setsper 1,000 inhabitants, representing a rise of around one-quarter since1939.33 Cinema admissions also peaked in 1943 1944 at over 1.1 billion,or 14.4 annual admissions per person, roughly a 40 per cent increaseover 1939.34How we should interpret these audience figures is, however, far fromstraightforward.Are they evidence of a persistent flow of communica-tion between regime and populace, or rather of an increasingly indi-vidualistic means of fleeing the demands of the regime and the stressesof everyday life? In quantitative terms, it is clear that the booming war-time demand for the media continued right through 1944.Yet there isevidence that the qualitative reasons for this changed somewhat over Radio, Film and Morale 167time.The fact that propaganda officials drew less and less attention tothe war effort in popular entertainments is all too understandable, andrelatively easy to demonstrate.Far more difficult to gauge are popu-lar tastes, though there are indications that audiences also increasinglysought a reprieve from the war the longer it dragged on and the worseit seemed to progress [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]
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.28 It was, in short, the epitome of avirtual national community , not only in the eyes of its producers butalso, it would seem, for millions of loyal listeners.But if the Wunschkonzert was highly effective at boosting nationalmorale, other developments in radio broadcasting threatened to under-mine it.Ever since its inception the German broadcasting system suf-fered from the inefficiencies of its federal structure, in which the nineFigure 8.3 Soldiers stationed in Austria enjoying a 3-mal Wunschkonzertshow, 12 February 1941Source: Courtesy of Bildarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz. Radio, Film and Morale 165regional companies filled around half of airtime in their respectivebroadcasting areas.Given the wartime demand for technical personneland resources, it was only a matter of time before programming struc-tures would undergo a significant overhaul.The broadcasting systemwas thus duly amalgamated on 9 July 1940 into a single, standardizedReich-wide radio programme.The problem was that such savings aswere made came at the expense of a huge reduction in choice for listen-ers, which threatened to undermine the very popularity of radio itself.Although officials soon moved to a dual programme for part of the day,which gave listeners a choice of at least two programmes, this still rep-resented a significant reduction of variety on the preceding system.29Broadcasters thus found themselves in an awkward position.Whereasthe Nazi leadership regarded radio as the single most important conduitbetween regime and populace, the standardization of the programmemade it more difficult to fulfil this mission.The pressures this gener-ated all pointed in one direction: since maximizing the number of lis-teners by offering a choice of programming was no longer feasible, theonly solution was to cater unambiguously to the majority.In practice,what this boiled down to was a further expansion of light entertain-ment at the expense of Kultur.Over the winter and spring of 19401941, amid rising concerns about the popularity of the BBC amongGerman soldiers (which prompted the launch of the soldiers stationRadio Belgrade in April 1941, whose cheery tone was highly popularamong civilians too30), there were mounting calls for a more entertain-ing national programme.These calls grew all the louder over summerand autumn 1941 as popular anxieties surrounding the invasion ofthe Soviet Union (in particular the elusiveness of victory in spite ofrepeated proclamations that the Russians were on their last legs) beganto undermine confidence in the official news sources.The fact thatthe radio programme underwent its most far-reaching overhaul duringautumn and winter 1941 1942, just when the German war effort beganto encounter serious problems, was thus no coincidence.As the stringof military triumphs began to dwindle, and as the thrill of victory couldno longer pull in the audience by itself, it became increasingly apparentthat the most promising means of binding listeners to the radio wasto provide light entertainment.When the revamped programme wasrolled out in October it reportedly met with almost universal approval.The shift of the programme towards almost exclusively cheerful andlight broadcasts is highly conspicuous.31 The blatantly populist tonethat would dominate Nazi wartime radio was subsequently buttressedby the restructuring of the Reich Broadcasting Company in February 166 Corey Ross1942.Just as the regime became more vicious and tyrannical than ever,it also became more concerned with listening pleasure.The agony of defeatYet by early 1942 no amount of entertainment could halt the risingtide of distrust.32 Although this rarely manifested itself in the form ofopen dissent, the growing sense of scepticism nonetheless signalleda fundamental change of mood.As the news gradually turned bad,propaganda officials, filmmakers and broadcasters increasingly shiftedthe emphasis away from triumphalist renditions of topical themestowards more escapist forms of entertainment as a means of maintain-ing morale.How far this was deliberately intended to distract attentionfrom military failures and how far it was a response to changing audi-ences expectations is difficult to say.It is in all events worth notingthat audience figures remained extraordinarily high, reaching recordlevels during the second half of the war.But this strategy nonethelessentailed certain trade-offs, for the resort to escapist amusements threat-ened to unravel the very sense of collective purpose that the mediahad helped to fabricate over the previous several years.As the hopes forfinal victory gradually succumbed to Allied bombs and Soviet guns, theenthralling combination of self-gratification and national mobilizationfrom the early war years began to separate.More and more, pleasure-seeking became just that.What is important to recognize is that this shift in the relation-ship between mobilization and distraction did not reduce demand forentertainment per se.Quite the opposite: while popular trust in thenews declined, light entertainment was more sought after than ever.Audience figures alone leave little doubt about this.Radio ownershipreached a peak in 1943 with 16,179,000 registered sets, or 190 setsper 1,000 inhabitants, representing a rise of around one-quarter since1939.33 Cinema admissions also peaked in 1943 1944 at over 1.1 billion,or 14.4 annual admissions per person, roughly a 40 per cent increaseover 1939.34How we should interpret these audience figures is, however, far fromstraightforward.Are they evidence of a persistent flow of communica-tion between regime and populace, or rather of an increasingly indi-vidualistic means of fleeing the demands of the regime and the stressesof everyday life? In quantitative terms, it is clear that the booming war-time demand for the media continued right through 1944.Yet there isevidence that the qualitative reasons for this changed somewhat over Radio, Film and Morale 167time.The fact that propaganda officials drew less and less attention tothe war effort in popular entertainments is all too understandable, andrelatively easy to demonstrate.Far more difficult to gauge are popu-lar tastes, though there are indications that audiences also increasinglysought a reprieve from the war the longer it dragged on and the worseit seemed to progress [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]