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.England had lost also the advantage of the surprise he would haveeffected by anticipating Spain's declaration of war; but her arms were triumphant during this short contest,through the rapidity with which her projects were carried into execution, due to the state of efficiency towhich her naval forces and administration had been brought.With the conquest of Manila ended the military operations of the war.Nine months, counting from the formaldeclaration by England in January, had been sufficient to shatter the last hope of France, and to bring Spain toCHAPTER VIII.SEVEN YEARS' WAR, 1756-1763 ENGLAND's OVERWHELMING POWER AND CONQU142 The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783a peace in which was conceded every point on which she had based her hostile attitude and demands.It seemsscarcely necessary, after even the brief summary of events that has been given, to point out that the speed andthoroughness with which England's work was done was due wholly to her sea power, which allowed herforces to act on distant points, widely apart as Cuba, Portugal, India, and the Philippines, without a fear ofserious break in their communications.Before giving the terms of peace which ought to summarize the results of the war, but do so imperfectly,owing to the weak eagerness of the English ministry to conclude it, it is necessary to trace in outline the effectof the war upon commerce, upon the foundations of sea power and national prosperity.One prominent feature of this war may be more strongly impressed upon the mind by a startling, becauseparadoxical, statement that the prosperity of the English is shown by the magnitude of their losses. From 1756 to 1760, states a French historian, French privateers captured from the English more thantwenty-five hundred merchantmen.In 1761, though France had not, so to speak, a single ship-of-the-line atsea, and though the English had taken two hundred and forty of our privateers, their comrades still took eighthundred and twelve English vessels.The explanation of the number of these prizes lies in the prodigiousgrowth of the English shipping.In 1760 it is claimed that the English had at sea eight thousand sail; of thesethe French captured nearly one tenth, despite escorts and cruisers.In the four years from 1756 to 1760 theFrench lost only nine hundred and fifty vessels. (1) 1.Martin: History of France. But this discrepancy is justly attributed by an English writer to the diminution of the French commerce andthe dread of falling into the hands of the English, which kept many of their trading-vessels from going tosea; and he goes on to point out that the capture of vessels was not the principal benefit resulting from theefficiency of England's fleets. Captures like Duquesne, Louisburg, Prince Edward's Island, the reduction ofSenegal, and later on of Guadeloupe and Martinique, were events no less destructive to French commerce andcolonies than advantageous to those of England. (1) The multiplication of French privateers was indeed a sadtoken to an instructed eye, showing behind them merchant shipping in enforced idleness, whose crews andwhose owners were driven to speculative pillage in order to live.Nor was this risk wholly in vain.The sameEnglishman confesses that in 1759 the losses of merchantmen showed a worse balance than the ships-of-war.While the French were striving in vain to regain equality upon the sea and repair their losses, but to nopurpose, for in building and aiming vessels they laboured only for the English fleet, yet, notwithstandingthe courage and vigilance of English cruisers, French privateers so swarmed that in this year they took twohundred and forty British vessels, chiefly coasters and small craft. In 1760 the same authority gives theBritish loss in trading-vessels at over three hundred, and in 1761 at over eight hundred, three times that of theFrench; but he adds It would not have been wonderful had they taken more and richer ships.While theircommerce was nearly destroyed, and they had few merchant-ships at sea, the trading-fleets of Englandcovered the seas.Every year her commerce was increasing; the money which the war carried out was returnedby the produce of her industry.Eight thousand vessels were employed by the traders of Great Britain. Theextent of her losses is attributed to three causes, of which the first only was preventable: 1.The inattention ofmerchant-ships o the orders of the convoying vessels; 2.The immense number of English ships in all seas; 3.The enemy's venturing the whole remains of his strength in privateering.During the same year, 1761, thenavy lost one ship-of-the-line, which was retaken, and one cutter.At the same time, notwithstanding thevarious exchanges, the English still held twenty-five thousand French prisoners, while the English prisonersin France were but twelve hundred.These were the results of the sea war. 1.Campbell: Lives of the Admirals. CHAPTER VIII.SEVEN YEARS' WAR, 1756-1763 ENGLAND's OVERWHELMING POWER AND CONQU143 The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783Finally, in summing up the commercial condition of the kingdom at the end of the war, after mentioning theenormous sums of specie taken from Spain, the writer says: These strengthened trade and fostered industry [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.England had lost also the advantage of the surprise he would haveeffected by anticipating Spain's declaration of war; but her arms were triumphant during this short contest,through the rapidity with which her projects were carried into execution, due to the state of efficiency towhich her naval forces and administration had been brought.With the conquest of Manila ended the military operations of the war.Nine months, counting from the formaldeclaration by England in January, had been sufficient to shatter the last hope of France, and to bring Spain toCHAPTER VIII.SEVEN YEARS' WAR, 1756-1763 ENGLAND's OVERWHELMING POWER AND CONQU142 The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783a peace in which was conceded every point on which she had based her hostile attitude and demands.It seemsscarcely necessary, after even the brief summary of events that has been given, to point out that the speed andthoroughness with which England's work was done was due wholly to her sea power, which allowed herforces to act on distant points, widely apart as Cuba, Portugal, India, and the Philippines, without a fear ofserious break in their communications.Before giving the terms of peace which ought to summarize the results of the war, but do so imperfectly,owing to the weak eagerness of the English ministry to conclude it, it is necessary to trace in outline the effectof the war upon commerce, upon the foundations of sea power and national prosperity.One prominent feature of this war may be more strongly impressed upon the mind by a startling, becauseparadoxical, statement that the prosperity of the English is shown by the magnitude of their losses. From 1756 to 1760, states a French historian, French privateers captured from the English more thantwenty-five hundred merchantmen.In 1761, though France had not, so to speak, a single ship-of-the-line atsea, and though the English had taken two hundred and forty of our privateers, their comrades still took eighthundred and twelve English vessels.The explanation of the number of these prizes lies in the prodigiousgrowth of the English shipping.In 1760 it is claimed that the English had at sea eight thousand sail; of thesethe French captured nearly one tenth, despite escorts and cruisers.In the four years from 1756 to 1760 theFrench lost only nine hundred and fifty vessels. (1) 1.Martin: History of France. But this discrepancy is justly attributed by an English writer to the diminution of the French commerce andthe dread of falling into the hands of the English, which kept many of their trading-vessels from going tosea; and he goes on to point out that the capture of vessels was not the principal benefit resulting from theefficiency of England's fleets. Captures like Duquesne, Louisburg, Prince Edward's Island, the reduction ofSenegal, and later on of Guadeloupe and Martinique, were events no less destructive to French commerce andcolonies than advantageous to those of England. (1) The multiplication of French privateers was indeed a sadtoken to an instructed eye, showing behind them merchant shipping in enforced idleness, whose crews andwhose owners were driven to speculative pillage in order to live.Nor was this risk wholly in vain.The sameEnglishman confesses that in 1759 the losses of merchantmen showed a worse balance than the ships-of-war.While the French were striving in vain to regain equality upon the sea and repair their losses, but to nopurpose, for in building and aiming vessels they laboured only for the English fleet, yet, notwithstandingthe courage and vigilance of English cruisers, French privateers so swarmed that in this year they took twohundred and forty British vessels, chiefly coasters and small craft. In 1760 the same authority gives theBritish loss in trading-vessels at over three hundred, and in 1761 at over eight hundred, three times that of theFrench; but he adds It would not have been wonderful had they taken more and richer ships.While theircommerce was nearly destroyed, and they had few merchant-ships at sea, the trading-fleets of Englandcovered the seas.Every year her commerce was increasing; the money which the war carried out was returnedby the produce of her industry.Eight thousand vessels were employed by the traders of Great Britain. Theextent of her losses is attributed to three causes, of which the first only was preventable: 1.The inattention ofmerchant-ships o the orders of the convoying vessels; 2.The immense number of English ships in all seas; 3.The enemy's venturing the whole remains of his strength in privateering.During the same year, 1761, thenavy lost one ship-of-the-line, which was retaken, and one cutter.At the same time, notwithstanding thevarious exchanges, the English still held twenty-five thousand French prisoners, while the English prisonersin France were but twelve hundred.These were the results of the sea war. 1.Campbell: Lives of the Admirals. CHAPTER VIII.SEVEN YEARS' WAR, 1756-1763 ENGLAND's OVERWHELMING POWER AND CONQU143 The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783Finally, in summing up the commercial condition of the kingdom at the end of the war, after mentioning theenormous sums of specie taken from Spain, the writer says: These strengthened trade and fostered industry [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]