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.The ideological foundationsfor such an alliance had been laid in the Brezhnev era, in Molodaia gvardiia,Nash sovremennik and Veche.The gosudarstvenniki instigated the coup ofAugust 1991, the defeat of which by Eltsin and Gorbachev was ultimately followedby the dissolution of the Union.The major role played by Eltsin and the institutions of the Russian Republic inthe rejection of the idea of empire represented the defeat of ideologicalmessianism by the Russians themselves.Those who rejected the policies ofWesternization and clung to the idea of empire, be it Russian or Soviet, foughtback bitterly against the new Russian administration, both inside and outsideparliament.The National Salvation Front drew together a large part of theopposition, both Communist and nationalist.After Eltsin violently suppressedthe Russian parliament in September-October 1993, it was Zhirinovsky whocapitalized best on the mood of national humiliation.By 1995, however, theCPRF led by Ziuganov with his gosudarstvennik ideology which dreweclectically but powerfully from imperialism, Slavophilism, Marxism-Leninismand Stalinist nostalgia dominated the opposition and emerged as the clear victorin the State Duma elections.His ideas drew from those articulated during theBrezhnev era in samizdat, by people such as Mikhail Antonov in Veche andGennady Shimanov.Ziuganov s messianism was not about world revolution butit emphasized Russia s uniqueness and focused on the voluntary restoration ofthe Soviet Union.Nevertheless, the following year the voters of Russia, facedwith a choice between Ziuganov and Eltsin as President, rejected a return to theCommunist past and re-elected Eltsin (who had, admittedly, borrowed some ofhis opponents clothes). CONCLUSION 147Central to Russian messianism is the idea of redemption through suffering.The suffering can be that of the peasants under serfdom, the Old Believers underan Antichrist Tsar, or the Russian people under Communism.The victimmentality has been further strengthened by the experience of repeatedinvasions, an experience Russia has shared with most of the East Europeanpeoples, from the Poles to the Serbs.These have their own messianisms,but Russians, unlike the other East Europeans, have the consciousness ofbelonging to what is (or should be) a major world power.A mighty country, located at the border of Europe and Asia, Russia is seen ashaving protected humanity against threats emanating from both, and paying ahuge price in the process.It protected Europe from the Tatar-Mongol hordes,underwent assaults from Poles and Swedes, and defended Europe againstNapoleon.After the October Revolution, it suffered the Wars of AlliedIntervention but then recovered and defeated Nazism.By its peaceful policy itprevented the Cold War from developing into a nuclear war.At the same timeRussia sacrificed its own development for that of the Soviet periphery, thesocialist countries and assorted Third World regimes.Since the development ofperestroika, Russia faced growing Western influence, the aggressive nationalismof the non-Russian republics, resurgent Islam, and finally the collapse of theSoviet Union.The Russian Federation has faced threats to its own territorialintegrity from the Caucasus, the criminalization of the State, the transformationfrom a military and industrial superpower to a supplier of raw materials to theWest, the enlargement of NATO and what is seen as the American desire forworld domination.But, for adherents of Russian messianism, Russia has its owninner strength, its spirituality, and will revive as a great power, creating its ownsocial model.Elements in the above picture are contradictory; it might be difficult, forexample, to see the Russian people as suffering both from the effects of AlliedIntervention against Communism and from Communism itself.But manyelements would find resonance with many Russians today: in society at large, inthe Communist and nationalist opposition, in the Moscow Patriarchate, theArmed Forces and even within the Eltsin regime.Alternatively, one might see Russian messianism as an example of collectiveparanoia: on the one hand, a persecution complex, linked to the memories ofbeing invaded, and more recently to a fever of conspiracy theories, centring onworld Jewry or the CIA, and to the fear of being excluded from Europe; on theother hand, the delusions of grandeur, typified by Moscow, the Third Rome and the belief in the October Revolution as the first step towards worldCommunism.At the same time, it seems that defensiveness was usually strongerin Russia than aggressive expansion.Muscovy expanded to protect itself fromoutside attack.In the Cold War, Eastern Europe was a buffer zone rather than aspringboard for further conquest.Lenin s call to defend the socialist fatherland wasfar more persuasive than Brezhnev s call to give fraternal aid to Afghanistan [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.The ideological foundationsfor such an alliance had been laid in the Brezhnev era, in Molodaia gvardiia,Nash sovremennik and Veche.The gosudarstvenniki instigated the coup ofAugust 1991, the defeat of which by Eltsin and Gorbachev was ultimately followedby the dissolution of the Union.The major role played by Eltsin and the institutions of the Russian Republic inthe rejection of the idea of empire represented the defeat of ideologicalmessianism by the Russians themselves.Those who rejected the policies ofWesternization and clung to the idea of empire, be it Russian or Soviet, foughtback bitterly against the new Russian administration, both inside and outsideparliament.The National Salvation Front drew together a large part of theopposition, both Communist and nationalist.After Eltsin violently suppressedthe Russian parliament in September-October 1993, it was Zhirinovsky whocapitalized best on the mood of national humiliation.By 1995, however, theCPRF led by Ziuganov with his gosudarstvennik ideology which dreweclectically but powerfully from imperialism, Slavophilism, Marxism-Leninismand Stalinist nostalgia dominated the opposition and emerged as the clear victorin the State Duma elections.His ideas drew from those articulated during theBrezhnev era in samizdat, by people such as Mikhail Antonov in Veche andGennady Shimanov.Ziuganov s messianism was not about world revolution butit emphasized Russia s uniqueness and focused on the voluntary restoration ofthe Soviet Union.Nevertheless, the following year the voters of Russia, facedwith a choice between Ziuganov and Eltsin as President, rejected a return to theCommunist past and re-elected Eltsin (who had, admittedly, borrowed some ofhis opponents clothes). CONCLUSION 147Central to Russian messianism is the idea of redemption through suffering.The suffering can be that of the peasants under serfdom, the Old Believers underan Antichrist Tsar, or the Russian people under Communism.The victimmentality has been further strengthened by the experience of repeatedinvasions, an experience Russia has shared with most of the East Europeanpeoples, from the Poles to the Serbs.These have their own messianisms,but Russians, unlike the other East Europeans, have the consciousness ofbelonging to what is (or should be) a major world power.A mighty country, located at the border of Europe and Asia, Russia is seen ashaving protected humanity against threats emanating from both, and paying ahuge price in the process.It protected Europe from the Tatar-Mongol hordes,underwent assaults from Poles and Swedes, and defended Europe againstNapoleon.After the October Revolution, it suffered the Wars of AlliedIntervention but then recovered and defeated Nazism.By its peaceful policy itprevented the Cold War from developing into a nuclear war.At the same timeRussia sacrificed its own development for that of the Soviet periphery, thesocialist countries and assorted Third World regimes.Since the development ofperestroika, Russia faced growing Western influence, the aggressive nationalismof the non-Russian republics, resurgent Islam, and finally the collapse of theSoviet Union.The Russian Federation has faced threats to its own territorialintegrity from the Caucasus, the criminalization of the State, the transformationfrom a military and industrial superpower to a supplier of raw materials to theWest, the enlargement of NATO and what is seen as the American desire forworld domination.But, for adherents of Russian messianism, Russia has its owninner strength, its spirituality, and will revive as a great power, creating its ownsocial model.Elements in the above picture are contradictory; it might be difficult, forexample, to see the Russian people as suffering both from the effects of AlliedIntervention against Communism and from Communism itself.But manyelements would find resonance with many Russians today: in society at large, inthe Communist and nationalist opposition, in the Moscow Patriarchate, theArmed Forces and even within the Eltsin regime.Alternatively, one might see Russian messianism as an example of collectiveparanoia: on the one hand, a persecution complex, linked to the memories ofbeing invaded, and more recently to a fever of conspiracy theories, centring onworld Jewry or the CIA, and to the fear of being excluded from Europe; on theother hand, the delusions of grandeur, typified by Moscow, the Third Rome and the belief in the October Revolution as the first step towards worldCommunism.At the same time, it seems that defensiveness was usually strongerin Russia than aggressive expansion.Muscovy expanded to protect itself fromoutside attack.In the Cold War, Eastern Europe was a buffer zone rather than aspringboard for further conquest.Lenin s call to defend the socialist fatherland wasfar more persuasive than Brezhnev s call to give fraternal aid to Afghanistan [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]