[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.The Columbia space shuttle incident provides a vivid example ofthis phenomenon.The Mission Management Team meetings movedquickly from one topic to another during Columbia s final mission.Each meeting had a packed agenda.The leader asked for input, butoften coupled that with a statement of her beliefs on the subject,while not waiting more than a few moments to allow people raisequestions or concerns.23 Brigadier General Duane Deal, a member ofthe Columbia Accident Investigation Board, has noted that the paceand tone of the meetings became intimidating to employees who hadsome concerns, but were struggling to process confusing and ambigu-ous information.24Encouraging Entrenchment and PolarizationSome leaders overcompensate when it comes to the efficiency of thedecision process.When employing competing teams in a DialecticalInquiry type process, they often make the mistake of allowing man-agers to spend too long in their subgroups prior to bringing everyonetogether to debate all the options.The leaders mean well; they simplywant to provide participants ample opportunity to investigate a par-ticular alternative and to consider its pros and cons thoroughly.Unfortunately, over time, people become heavily invested, cogni-tively and emotionally, in the option that they have been examining.25Naturally, they find themselves less willing to entertain other options,or to hear criticism of their proposals.Furthermore, as people workclosely together over time, they may begin to associate more closelywith their subgroups as opposed to the full team.They may start toperceive subgroup members in a very positive light, while taking amore critical view of those colleagues who are members of the othersubgroup.Those distinctions can impede communication and make itdifficult for people to reach compromises.Debates can becomehighly contentious.26 CHAPTER 4 " STIMULATING THE CLASH OF IDEAS 107Striving for False PrecisionMany organizations perform a great deal of formal analysis duringcritical decision-making processes.If possible, managers try to quan-tify as many of the costs and benefits associated with alternativecourses of action.Quantitative data can certainly facilitate the com-parison of various options, and they can help ensure that debatesremain fact based and logical, rather than degenerating into purelyemotional confrontations.Moreover, quantitative analysis tends tolend an air of legitimacy to the decision-making process; it helps con-vince others inside and outside the organization that managers wentthrough a thoughtful analysis prior to choosing a course of action.27Unfortunately, the strong desire to quantify as many aspects ofthe decision as possible occasionally distracts people from the realissues.Managers begin to argue about minor differences of opinionregarding the numbers, rather than addressing fundamental prob-lems associated with one or more alternatives.People s time becomesconsumed with attempting to generate as precise a number as possi-ble.However, the high degree of uncertainty about future eventsmakes such efforts at precision rather futile and perhaps even coun-terproductive.Think for a moment about a typical acquisition decision.Managers often spend an inordinate amount of time trying to perfectthe financial model that forecasts the cash flow in the years ahead.However, as Polycom Chief Financial Officer Mike Kourey has said, At the end of the day, many discounted cash-flow models turn out tobe bogus.With the right assumptions, any deal can appear promising.That is why we test the assumptions carefully. 28 Unfortunately, manyfirms tinker endlessly with the financial model, without probing theunderlying strategic and operational premises that lie behind thecash-flow forecasts.As attention focuses on minor variations of afinancial forecast, those who may have questions regarding the strate-gic logic behind the acquisition may not feel comfortable raising 108 WHY GREAT LEADERS DON T TAKE YES FOR AN ANSWERthose questions.They may conclude that the decision has been madeto go forward, and managers are now simply trying to determine theright price to pay for the target firm.29Practice Makes PerfectEncouraging conflict can indeed be a tricky endeavor; as we haveseen, leaders often inadvertently discourage dissent and diminish theeffectiveness of a debate.Fortunately, practice does make perfector at least substantial improvement when it comes to managingconflict.Researchers David Schweiger, William Sandberg, and PaulaRechner have examined how groups perform as they employ theDevil s Advocacy and Dialectical Inquiry techniques repeatedly overtime.As you may expect, groups benefited from experience in thisexperimental study.As teams utilized the techniques more often,they engaged in higher levels of critical evaluation and made better-quality decisions (as measured by a panel of expert judges).The timerequired to reach a decision diminished with experience.Furthermore, people expressed a higher level of satisfaction with theprocesses, fellow team members, and final decisions as they gainedmore experience with these techniques.30Several very successful business leaders, such as Jack Welch andChuck Knight, have demonstrated how important it is to make vigor-ous debate the norm, rather than the exception, within an organiza-tion.As people engage in debate on a regular basis, in a wide range ofsettings within the firm, they become more comfortable with conflict.At General Electric, everyone quickly came to understand the type ofdialogue that Welch intended to foster, and they learned how toengage in a heated, yet productive, debate with him.Colleagues rec-ognized that Jack will chase you around the room, throwing objec-tions and arguments at you, and that, If you win [an argument], younever know if you ve convinced him or if he agreed with you all alongand he was just making you strut your stuff. 31 Welch reinforced these CHAPTER 4 " STIMULATING THE CLASH OF IDEAS 109impressions by declaring constructive conflict one of GE s core val-ues, something about which he talked early, loudly, and often.32Chuck Knight, Emerson Electric s long-time CEO, designed con-frontation into the company s infamous strategic planning process.The planning conferences represented the focal point of this process [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
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.The Columbia space shuttle incident provides a vivid example ofthis phenomenon.The Mission Management Team meetings movedquickly from one topic to another during Columbia s final mission.Each meeting had a packed agenda.The leader asked for input, butoften coupled that with a statement of her beliefs on the subject,while not waiting more than a few moments to allow people raisequestions or concerns.23 Brigadier General Duane Deal, a member ofthe Columbia Accident Investigation Board, has noted that the paceand tone of the meetings became intimidating to employees who hadsome concerns, but were struggling to process confusing and ambigu-ous information.24Encouraging Entrenchment and PolarizationSome leaders overcompensate when it comes to the efficiency of thedecision process.When employing competing teams in a DialecticalInquiry type process, they often make the mistake of allowing man-agers to spend too long in their subgroups prior to bringing everyonetogether to debate all the options.The leaders mean well; they simplywant to provide participants ample opportunity to investigate a par-ticular alternative and to consider its pros and cons thoroughly.Unfortunately, over time, people become heavily invested, cogni-tively and emotionally, in the option that they have been examining.25Naturally, they find themselves less willing to entertain other options,or to hear criticism of their proposals.Furthermore, as people workclosely together over time, they may begin to associate more closelywith their subgroups as opposed to the full team.They may start toperceive subgroup members in a very positive light, while taking amore critical view of those colleagues who are members of the othersubgroup.Those distinctions can impede communication and make itdifficult for people to reach compromises.Debates can becomehighly contentious.26 CHAPTER 4 " STIMULATING THE CLASH OF IDEAS 107Striving for False PrecisionMany organizations perform a great deal of formal analysis duringcritical decision-making processes.If possible, managers try to quan-tify as many of the costs and benefits associated with alternativecourses of action.Quantitative data can certainly facilitate the com-parison of various options, and they can help ensure that debatesremain fact based and logical, rather than degenerating into purelyemotional confrontations.Moreover, quantitative analysis tends tolend an air of legitimacy to the decision-making process; it helps con-vince others inside and outside the organization that managers wentthrough a thoughtful analysis prior to choosing a course of action.27Unfortunately, the strong desire to quantify as many aspects ofthe decision as possible occasionally distracts people from the realissues.Managers begin to argue about minor differences of opinionregarding the numbers, rather than addressing fundamental prob-lems associated with one or more alternatives.People s time becomesconsumed with attempting to generate as precise a number as possi-ble.However, the high degree of uncertainty about future eventsmakes such efforts at precision rather futile and perhaps even coun-terproductive.Think for a moment about a typical acquisition decision.Managers often spend an inordinate amount of time trying to perfectthe financial model that forecasts the cash flow in the years ahead.However, as Polycom Chief Financial Officer Mike Kourey has said, At the end of the day, many discounted cash-flow models turn out tobe bogus.With the right assumptions, any deal can appear promising.That is why we test the assumptions carefully. 28 Unfortunately, manyfirms tinker endlessly with the financial model, without probing theunderlying strategic and operational premises that lie behind thecash-flow forecasts.As attention focuses on minor variations of afinancial forecast, those who may have questions regarding the strate-gic logic behind the acquisition may not feel comfortable raising 108 WHY GREAT LEADERS DON T TAKE YES FOR AN ANSWERthose questions.They may conclude that the decision has been madeto go forward, and managers are now simply trying to determine theright price to pay for the target firm.29Practice Makes PerfectEncouraging conflict can indeed be a tricky endeavor; as we haveseen, leaders often inadvertently discourage dissent and diminish theeffectiveness of a debate.Fortunately, practice does make perfector at least substantial improvement when it comes to managingconflict.Researchers David Schweiger, William Sandberg, and PaulaRechner have examined how groups perform as they employ theDevil s Advocacy and Dialectical Inquiry techniques repeatedly overtime.As you may expect, groups benefited from experience in thisexperimental study.As teams utilized the techniques more often,they engaged in higher levels of critical evaluation and made better-quality decisions (as measured by a panel of expert judges).The timerequired to reach a decision diminished with experience.Furthermore, people expressed a higher level of satisfaction with theprocesses, fellow team members, and final decisions as they gainedmore experience with these techniques.30Several very successful business leaders, such as Jack Welch andChuck Knight, have demonstrated how important it is to make vigor-ous debate the norm, rather than the exception, within an organiza-tion.As people engage in debate on a regular basis, in a wide range ofsettings within the firm, they become more comfortable with conflict.At General Electric, everyone quickly came to understand the type ofdialogue that Welch intended to foster, and they learned how toengage in a heated, yet productive, debate with him.Colleagues rec-ognized that Jack will chase you around the room, throwing objec-tions and arguments at you, and that, If you win [an argument], younever know if you ve convinced him or if he agreed with you all alongand he was just making you strut your stuff. 31 Welch reinforced these CHAPTER 4 " STIMULATING THE CLASH OF IDEAS 109impressions by declaring constructive conflict one of GE s core val-ues, something about which he talked early, loudly, and often.32Chuck Knight, Emerson Electric s long-time CEO, designed con-frontation into the company s infamous strategic planning process.The planning conferences represented the focal point of this process [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]